OF NATURAL RELIGION,

or

GODLINESS.

CHAP. I.

Of the nearest Truths, viz., of Human Nature.

Resolving on a faithful search into the nature and certainty of religion, as being the business which my own and all men's happiness is most concerned in, being conscious of my weakness, and knowing that truths have their certain order, in which they give much light to one another, I found it meet to begin at the most evident, from whence I ascended in the order following.\(^a\)

Sect. 1. I am past all doubt that I have sense, cogitation, understanding, and will, with executive operation.\(^b\)

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\(^a\) Non tam authoritatis in disputando, quam rationis momenta quærenda sunt. Cicer. de Nat. Deor. 1, p. 6.

Animo ipso animus videtur, et nimimur, hanc habet vim præceptum Apollinis, quod monet ut se quisque noscat: non enim credo id præcipit ut membra nostra, aut staturam figurâmve noscamus: neque nos corpora sumus: neque ego tibi dicens hoc corpori tuo dico. Cum igitur nosce te, dicit, hoc dicit, nos ce animum tuum. Nam corpus quidem quasi vas est, aut aliquod animi receptaculum: ab animo tuo qui quid agitur id agitur à te. Hunc igitur nosce nisi divinum esset, non esset hoc aërioris cujusdam animi præceptum, sic ut tributum Deo sit, hoc est, seipsam posse cognoscere, sed sit qualis sit animus, ipsae animus nesciat, dic quæso, ne esse quidem se sciet? Cicero Tuscul. Quest. 1, pp. (mihi) 226, 227.

Patet æternum id esse quod seipsam movet; et quis est qui hanc naturam animis tributam neget. Inanimum est eunm omne quod puls agitatur externo. Sentit igitur animus se moveri: quod cum sentit, illud una sentit, se vi sua, non alienâ moveri; nec accidere posse ut ipse unquam à se deseratur æternitas. Id. ibid.

\(^b\) Obj. Age ostende mihi Deum tuum.


Cum despicere coeperimus et sentire, quid simus, et quid ab animantibus cæteris differamus, tum ea insequi incipiemus, ad quæ nati sumus.—Cicer. 5, de Fin.

Though I could not exactly define what these are, yet I am satisfied that I have them: and I discern that a simple term doth better express one of these to me, than a definition doth; because they are known so immediately, in and of themselves, partly by internal sensation, and partly by intuition. And words are but to make known my mind about them to another, and another's to me; but the things themselves are otherwise to be known. What it is to see, to hear, to smell, to taste, I know better by seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, than by any definitions of them; and the bare denomination, when I understand the term, is my best expression. And if I could not answer a sceptic, who denied the certainty of my judgment by sensation and reflexive intuition, yet nature would not suffer me to doubt: or if any such should really make me doubt whether I may not possibly live in a continual delusory dream, and all my senses and understanding be deceived, yet would it satisfy me in the main, that I must judge by such powers as I have, and can do no better, and therefore should be no further solicitous. If any would persuade me that I feel not when I am sick or wounded, or see not when I see, or taste not when or what I taste, yet must I be persuaded, that fallible or infallible, this sense must be used, and serve for the ends to which it is given to me; and that I have no better faculties to use.

Sect. 2. By my actions I know that I am; and that I am a sentient, intelligent, thinking, willing, and operative being; or a wight that hath these powers.

For *ab operari ad posse et esse*, the consequence is undoubted. Nothing is no agent; and none doth that which he cannot do.

Sect. 3. This mind, or aforesaid power, is found in, or conjunct with, an organised body.

He that doubteth not of his sense and intellection, need not doubt of his body, which is the object of both.

Sect. 4. This body is a quantitative or extensive, nutritive, changeable, corruptible matter.

Of which my senses and experience will not suffer me to doubt.

Sect. 5. This mind is fitted to the use of knowing, and is desirous of it, delighted in it, and the more it knoweth, the more it is able and disposed to know.

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*c* Ut Deum moris, et si ignores et locum et faciem; sic animam tibi tum notum esse oportet, etiam si ignores et locum et formam.—Cicer. 1, Tuscul.

*d* Non ii summus quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris falsa quidam adjuvera esse dicamus tamta similitudine, ut, &c.—Cicer. *de Nat. Deor.* 1, p. 7.
All this our actions and experience testify. Knowing is to the mind, as seeing is to the eye. One act of knowledge promoteth and facilitateth another.

Sect. 6. Being and verity are its direct objects.
As light and colours are the objects of our sight. To these it hath power and inclination.

Sect. 7. When I know the effects, I have an inclination to know the cause; not only the lower, but the very first.

Though it be possible that some sensual, sluggish person, may be so taken up with present earthly things, as to drown these desires, and scarce to think of any first cause, or take any pleasure in the exercise of his higher faculties; yet as I feel it otherwise in myself, so I find it otherwise in multitudes of others, and in all that have free minds, and in the worst at certain times; so that I perceive it is natural to man, to desire to know even the first cause, and highest excellency.

Sect. 8. Yet do I find that my mind is not satisfied in knowing, nor is entity and verity the ultimate object which my mind looketh after, but goodness.

Entity and verity may be unwelcome, loathed things, if against my good. The thief could wish, that neither law, nor judge, nor gallows had a being, and that his sentence were not true. Knowledge is but a mediate motion of the soul, directive to the following volitions and prosecution.

Sect. 9. I find I have a will, inclined to apprehend good; that is, both to that which hath a simple excellency in itself, and which maketh for the happiness of the world, or for my own.

This maketh itself as well known to me, as my natural appetite. For my apprehensions do but subservit, and my life is moved or ruled by it.

Sect. 10. It is also averse to apprehended evil as such, as contrary to the aforesaid good.

Though real evil may possibly be chosen, when it is a seeming good, and also that which appeareth proximately evil, for a higher good to which it seemeth a means, yet ultimately and for itself, no rational will desireth or chooseth evil.

=e Lege Pisonis dicta de mente et corpore.—Cicer. de Faub. l. 5, p. 189.
=f Omnes ad id quod bonum videtur, omnes suas actiones referunt.—Aristot. de Republ. 1, c. 1.
=g In homine optimum quidem ratio, haec antecedit animalia, Deos sequitur.—Sen. ep. 77.
=h Malitia premiis exercetur: ubi ea denuoerat, nemo omnium gratuimus malus est.—Salust.
Sect. 11. While sensitive pleasure is apprehended as good by the senses, reason may discern a further good, which may cross at least the present sense.

To take bitter physic, to corrode or cut off ulcerated parts, to use hard diet and exercise, &c., may be ungrateful in themselves to sense; and yet commended by reason, and commanded by the will; I yet forbear all higher instances.

Sect. 12. My sense and bodily faculties are naturally to be subjected to the guidance of my reason and the command of my will, as the superior faculties.

For one is common to brutes, and the other proper to rational creatures; and rational agents are more excellent than brutes; and the most excellent should rule. Reason can see further than sense; and the wisest is most fit to govern. They that deny this, should claim no government or power over their beasts, their dogs, or sheep. If reason ruled not sensuality, most persons would presently destroy their lives; even as swine would kill themselves with eating; if the reason of man did not restrain them.

Sect. 13. The sum is, that man is a living wight, having an active and executive power, with an understanding to guide it, and a will to command it; and that there is a certain difference between truth and falsehood, natural good, and evil.

All this is quite beyond dispute.

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CHAP. II.

Of Man, as related to the things below him.

Sect. 1. There are other things, called inanimates and brutes, in being, besides man.

My understanding, by the help of all my senses, telleth me that there are beasts and birds, trees and herbs, and that I live among a multitude of beings inferior to man. Though I may be ignorant of their principles, and many things in their natures,

1. Animis imperio, corporis servitio magis utinam: alterum nobis cum. Diis, alterum cum belluis commune est.—Salust. Cat.
   Est homini cum Deo rationis societas.—Cic. 1, de Leg.
2. Deus animal unum spectabile hominem, in quo omnia animalia contine- rentur effect.—Cic. de Univers.
3. Aliorum causa omnia generata sunt, ut effruges atque fructus quos terra gignit animantium causâ; animantes autem hominum; ut equum vehendi causa, &c. Ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum, &c.—Cic. 2, de Nat. Deor.
yet can I no more doubt of their being than of my own, nor of the inferiority of their natures, when I see their inferior operations.

Sect. 2. Man hath a certain sub-propriety in them for his use. They that deny this, will not say their lands, their fruits, their money, their goods and cattle are their own; nor question any one for stealing them, or depriving them of their propriety; nor may they possess and use them as their own.

Sect. 3. Man hath the right of governing the brutes, so far as they are capable of government.

Which is not by proper, moral government, by laws and judgment; but such an image of it as is suitable to their several kinds. This is in order to their own preservation, but especially for our use and ends: he that denieth this, must not rule his dog, his horse, or ox, or sheep, but leave them every one to themselves.

Sect. 4. Man is also, subordinately, their benefactor, and their end; and they are more for him than for themselves.

He is their end as he is better than they, and hath the afore-said propriety in them: the cause will further appear anon. The beauty and sweetness of my flowers are more for me than for themselves, and I do more enjoy them. My trees, and herbs, and fruits, and metals; my horse and ox that labour for me, and all the creatures on whom I feed, I find are for my use; even their life and labour. Mankind accuseth not himself as wronging them, when for his own advantage he maketh use of both; and his care is necessary to their preservation: planting, dressing, watering, feeding, defending, providing for them; without which the most useful would perish.

Sect. 5. The sum is, that man is the owner, the governor, and the end and benefactor of the inferior beings; and so is lord among them in the world.

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CHAP. III.

Of Men as mutually related to each other.

Sect. 1. I see that there are more men besides upon earth. a

Sect. 2. The natural dignity of men, and their likeness to

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a Bestis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint sine injuriā.

b Nullum est unum uni tam simile, tam par, quam omnes inter nosipsos sumūs. Quod si depraevatio consueudinum, si opinionum varietas, non imbecilitatem animorum torqueret, et flecteret, quocunque copissent, sui nemo ipse tam simili esset, quam omnes essent omnium. — Cic. I, de Leg.
each other, maketh them all confess that it is their duty to love
one another.

He that denieth this, will not expect to be loved himself by
others, nor will he pretend to any virtue, nor to merit the
benefit of human converse.

Sect. 3. Individual persons are commonly conscious of self-
insufficiency, and of their need of others, and inclined to a
sociable life.

If birds and beasts will go together, in flights and herds, with
those of their own kind, no wonder if man also have a natural
inclination to society, besides the knowledge of the necessity
and benefits of it.

Sect. 4. Each individual, in these societies, must contribute
his endeavours to the common good.\(^6\)

For this is the end of the association: he that will be for
none but himself, cannot justly expect that any should be for
him; and he that would have all the society be helpful to him,
must to his power be helpful to all.

Sect. 5. The distinction of persons, and their interests and
actions, foundeth a distinction of propriety and rights.\(^7\)

For natural individuation maketh it necessary that every
man have his own food, and his own clothing, at least for the
time; and, therefore, it is usually needful to the good of the
whole and the parts, that each one have also their provisional
proprieties; and the difference of men in wit and folly, industry
and sloth, virtue and vice, good or ill deserts, will also cause a
difference of propriety and rights, though these may be in part
subjected to the common good.

Sect. 6. Parents, also, may upon the merits of children, if not
arbitrarily, make an inequality in propriety, and so may other
donors and benefactors.

As all children need not the same proportion, so all deserve
not the same, and those parents that have great estates, may
leave more to their own children than to others; so that many
ways, both propriety and disproportion may certainly come to
pass, and be allowed in the world.

Sect. 7. Therefore, there is such a thing as justice due from

\(^6\) Homines hominum causâ sunt generati, ut ipsi inter se, alii alis prodesse
possint.—Cic. 1, Offic.

\(^7\) Sic nos nati videmur, ut inter omnes esset societas quædam.—Cic. de
Amicit.

Homo naturaliter est animal politicum et civile.—Arist. 1, Polit.
man to man, for the preservation of these rights and order, and it is injustice to violate them.  

This is confessed by all the world, that look for justice from others; and if it be not maintained, the world will be as in a continual war or robbery, but better grounds and proofs of it will be mentioned anon.

Sect. 8. Therefore, there is a difference between good and evil, as respecting the benefit or hurt of others, besides that which respecteth men as to themselves.

Those that think they are bound to avoid hurting no man but themselves, or for themselves, nor to do good to any but themselves, or for themselves, have so far obliterated the laws of humanity, and so openly renounce the benefit of society, and bid defiance to mankind, that I suppose them so few, that I need not dispute against them; nor have I ever met with any defender of so inhuman a cause, whatever may be in their hearts and practice.

Sect. 9. Nature teacheth parents to educate their children in sobriety, obedience, justice, and charity, and to restrain their contraries.

Did parents make no difference between their children’s temperance and gluttony, drunkenness and unchastity; between their obedience and disobedience, and contempt of their own authority; between actions of justice and charity, and actions of falsehood, robbery, cruelty, and inhumanity, what a degenerate thing would mankind prove: even cannibals exercise some government over their children.

Sect. 10. The means which nature teacheth all the world to suppress iniquity, and promote well doing, is by punishments and benefits, that it may turn to the hurt of the evil doer himself, and to the benefit of the well doer.

Thus parents do, by children, yea, men by beasts, on account of prudence, though not of justice. Without punishments and rewards or benefits, laws are ridiculous or deceits, and government is nothing.

Sect. 11. For the just and effectual performance of this, nature teacheth the world to set up governments, that by

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*Inter nos natura ad civilem communitatem conjuncti et consociati sumus. Quod nisi se haberet, nec justitiae ulius esset nec bonitatis locus; et quoniam hominum inter homines juris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil juris esse cum bestiis; Chrysippus aut cetera nata esse hominum causa et Deorum; eos autem societatis suae, &c.—Cato in Cicer. de Finib. l. 3, p. 110.*
settled laws and righteous judgment it might be rightly done.\(^7\)

Though better principles should acquaint men with the nature and necessity of government, yet these are so obvious to all the world, that for their own preservation, together with some natural sense of justice, the most barbarous nations, that are nearest unto brutes, are for some civil government, besides economical government, which none but madmen ever questioned.

Sect. 12. By this government, the liberty, estates, and lives of offenders are destroyed, for the ends of the government, viz., for justice and the common good.

That this is so, \textit{de facto}, is so undeniable, that even those heathens, the supposed relics of the Pythagoreans, who will not kill a harmless beast, will yet kill those men who deserve to die; and if government had not the power over the liberties, estates, and lives of offenders, it could not preserve the liberties, estates, and lives of the innocent.

Sect. 13. The combination of the power, wisdom, and goodness of the individuals, and the eminency of these in the governors, is the cause of the order, strength, and safety of these human societies.\(^8\)

All the parts are in the combination to contribute to the good of the whole, and that according to the nature of the parts. It is not a heap of stones, nor a forest of trees, nor a herd of cattle, which we are speaking of, but an association of men, which must be promoted and blessed by the worth and duty of the individual; and this consisteth in the perfections and right exercise of their power, intellects and wills. But as the place of the governor requireth more of the exercise of these than is requisite in any individual else, so doth it therefore require, that these be in him in greater eminency and excellency than in others, viz., that in himself, he excel in wisdom and goodness, and by his interest in the people, that he excel in power or strength. Take away power, and societies are indefensible, exposed to the will of enemies, and unable to execute their laws

\(^7\) Salus civitatis in legibus est.—\textit{Arist.} 1, \textit{Rhet.} c. 4.

\(^8\) Quoniam ea natura esset hominis, ut ei cum genere humano quasi civile jus intercederet qui id conservaret, eum justum, qui migraret injustum fore.—\textit{Chrysip. in Cato. in Cicer. ubi supra.}

\(^9\) Est unum jus quo devincta est hominum societas, et quod lex constituit una: Quae lex recta ratio est imperandi atque prohibendi.—\textit{Cicer. de Leg.} 1, \textit{p.} 225.
upon their own offenders, and so to attain the ends of their association and government; take away wisdom, and they are a rout of idiots or madmen, and government can be none at all: take away goodness, and they are as a company of devils, or as a confederacy of robbers or pernicious enemies, who can neither trust one another, nor promote the common good, but are fit to destroy and be destroyed.

Sect. 14. By all this, it is manifest, that man is not only a living wight, having power, intellect, and will, and dominion over inferior things, as their owner, ruler, and end; but also is a sociable wight, or fitted for society where government is exercised by power, wisdom, and goodness, which are his perfections.¹

I have looked thus long at the things that are seen, as nearest me, and most discernible, before I proceed to the cause, which is unseen.

CHAP. IV.

Of Man, and other things, as produced by their first cause.

Sect. 1. I was not always what I am.²

It is not yet sixty years since I was no man; I had a late beginning, and though I now inquire not of what duration my soul is, my present composition is not from eternity: the same I see of others, that are born men, who were lately none, and so of all things that are here generated.

Sect. 2. I did not make myself, at least, as an independent, uncaused being.³

¹ Si veritatem de anima cognoverimus, valde magnum nobis erit introducitorium ad omnem veritatem, et ad omnes partes philosophiae insignes dat occasiones.—Themist. sup. 1, de Anim.

² Read Galen’s ‘Admirations of the Creator,’ 1. de usu part. præcipe. 1. 3, cap. 10.

³ Animorum nullo in terris origo est. Nil enim est in animis nostris mistum, et concretum, aut quod ex terra natum, humidum, igneum, &c. His enim naturis nihil inest quod vim memoriae, mentis, cogitationis habeat, &c. Nec invenietur unquam unde ad hominem venire possit, nisi à Deo.—Cicero.

Quis est tam vecors, qui cum suspexerit in cælum, Deus esse non sentiat; et ea quæ tantà mente sunt, ut vix quisquam arte illa, ordinem rerum, atque vicissitudinem persequi possit, casu fieri putet.—Cicer. de Resp. Arusp.

Placet Stoicis corruptibilem esse mundum, quippe genitum corum ratione qua per sensus intelligitur. Cujus et partes sunt corruptibiles et totum, partes autem mundi corruptibiles sunt, in se invicem mutantur. Est igitur corruptibilis mundus. Ac quicquid mutari in deterius potest, corruptibile est. Mundus autem huic mutationi et corruptioni obnoxius est.—Laert. in Zennon.
I could not, as I am, make myself what I am, for so myself as the cause, should be before myself, as the effect, which is a contradiction, unless the word "self" be used equivocally: when I was not, I acted not. If it be said by any, that the soul did fabricate a body to itself, and so one part of me made the other, I answer, 1. My soul did not make the matter of that body; for if it did, it made it of something or of nothing: if of something, it either made that something or not; if not, then it made not the first matter of the body: if it made it of nothing, it must be omnipotent, but it is conscious of impotency.

2. My soul did not make itself, for then, it must be before itself, which is impossible; and if I made neither form nor matter, I did not make myself. If it be said, that my soul is an eternal, uncaused being, and so did fabricate this body as a dwelling for itself, I answer, 1. As to the supposed fabrication, it is conscious itself of no such thing, and if my soul made my body, either it was as a causa subministra vel instrumentalis, by the direction and power of a supreme cause, or else of and by itself, as the prime cause: if the first, then, it is a caused and dependent being itself, and so leadeth us to a higher cause: if the second be affirmed, and so my soul an eternal, uncaused, independent being, then, 1. That which is without beginning, cause, and dependency, must needs be self-sufficient, and be the highest excellency; it must have an infiniteness, and need no help from any other; but my soul is conscious of imperfection in knowledge, its ignorance is its burden and dishonour, it knoweth not so much as is here asserted of itself, it knoweth no such perfections or operations, it knoweth little comparatively of the universe or of any particular thing in it. If it were an eternal, uncaused, independent being, it need not all the helps of evidence and argument in this dispute; moreover, it is conscious of imperfection in goodness and defilement of evil; it is defective in governing this flesh, which could never be able to make me a sinner, or culpable, if it were animated by an uncaused, independent being; moreover, I am conscious of impotency in every thing that I go about; a thousand difficulties pose and stall me; a thousand things I would do, and cannot, and as many I would have, and cannot; whereas, an uncaused, independent mind, should necessarily have an uncaused, independent power, and wisdom, and goodness, and so should at least partake of infiniteness in all.

And if my soul did thus fabricate my body, then what need
it pre-existent matter to make it of? And why did it not make it sooner, seeing it hath such an inclination to it? Can an independent mind be ignorant what it was, and what it did itself from all eternity, before it entered into this flesh? And why doth it not amend the infirmities of this body; or why did it not make itself a body more excellent, more comely, more sound, more clean, and more durable? Could it choose no better? Can it not heal and perfect this? Can it not prevent the dissolution of it? Seeing I find it so much in love with it, and so unwilling to be separated from it, if it were an independent mind, and caused it at the first, it would not be unwillingly taken from it, and leave it to rottenness and dust.  

And if my soul did thus independently make my body, did all other souls do so by their bodies, or not? If they did not, then they had a superior cause; if they did, then it seems that every worm and fly and toad hath a soul, that is, an eternal, uncaused, independent being. But why then have they no knowledge, no reason, no speech? Why did they not choose a more honourable dwelling? Why do they all stoop to the service of man, if they are equally excellent. And then it would follow that there are as many eternal independent beings as there are souls, or living wights, in all the world. And so instead of one true, perfect God, there would be innumerable demi-gods, which all had the perfection of independencies, and none of them had a perfection of being and sufficiency, which would put us upon the further inquiries, whether they do all their business independently, or by a general council and consent, and how they all do to agree, and not fall into perpetual wars; how the soul of an idiot, or a wicked man, or of a toad or serpent, came to be so self-denying as to be contented with that part, when the soul of Aristotle, and Seneca, and Paul were so much better provided for.

And if all this were so, who made the things inanimate, that have no souls of their own to make them? For my part I made them not. And my soul is conscious that it is a dependent being, that cannot illuminate itself, nor know what it would know, nor be what it would be, nor do what it would do, nor can support its body or itself an hour. It looketh depend-

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7 Mundum autem fieri (dicit Stoici) cum ex igne substantia per aerem versa in humorem fuerit; deinde erassor ipsius pars effecta fuerit terra; porro subtilior in aerem cesserit eademque magis ac magis extenuata in ignem evaserit.—Luert., in Zenone.
ently to something higher for help, and protection, and supply, and mercy; and it is past all doubt that it is on God.

If it be said, that all souls are but one, even parts of the universal soul of the world, and that individuation is by matter only, and that so though my soul be not the whole first cause and being, it is a part of it; I answer, 1. I note by the way, that this hypothesis acknowledgeth that which I am searching after, viz., that there is a God: and it asserteth higher things of man than I am proving, viz., that he hath not only an immortal soul, but a soul that is part of God himself: 2. And according to this, the soul of every Heliogabalus, Sardanapalus, idiot, or toad, should be part of God: 3. And then all souls should be alike, if all be God; the soul of a murderer, and of him that is murdered; of a Nero and a saint; yea, of Caesar and of his dog. And how then cometh there so much enmity between them, and so great disparity? Why is one wise, and another foolish or brutish, and one the ruler of the other? The soul of a bird or horse seemeth to be lodged in as good a kind of matter as man's; or, at least, the soul of a Nero in as good a matter as the soul of Paul; or, at least, the soul of one that turneth from villany to virtue hath the same matter which it had before. And certainly it is not matter that principally individuateth, but forms. Nor is the difference between good men and bad, and between men, and serpents or beasts, so much in matter as in the soul.  

Moreover, nature teacheth all men to seek felicity, and fear infelicity and calamity; which they need not do, nor could not do, if they were all parts of God. God cannot be miserable, but man can, as to his soul as well as his body; and the misery of the body is little to that of the soul, even in this life. God cannot be evil, but the soul may be vitiated and evil, as experience teacheth. God may not be punished or afflicted, but a wicked man may be punished and afflicted even in his mind or soul; and a magistrate will not think, when he hangeth a thief, that he either punisheth bare flesh, or that he punisheth God.

Moreover, God can wrong no man, but one man may wrong

*Chrysippus et Posidonius aium Mundum regi et administrari secundum mentem et providentiam, mente per omnes illius partes pertingente; sicut et in nostra anima contingit, sed per has magis, per illas minus.—Laert. in Zeno.

Anaxagoras docuit mentem, confusis primo rebus accessisse, omniaque compugisse simul et ordinasse.—Laert. in Aux. ex Timone.

Ovil's *Description of the Creation of the World,* is almost as if he had taken it out of Moses.—Metham. 1. 1.
another; God need not fear doing any thing amiss, but the soul of man must fear it. No part of God can be so unhappy as to choose to be a toad, or a wicked or miserable man. God hath no body, but so have these souls; else when men eat a plant, or bird, or any flesh, they eat part of the body of God.

Moreover, I find, that it is bodies only that are quantitative or extensive, and so divisible into parts. Many parts of one body may be animated by one soul, but not by many parts of that one soul, except the soul be material itself.

But why (may some object) may I not hold, that all the orbs being one world, are one body of one informing soul, which is God; and so that really those which you call individuals, are but parts of this one animated world? Answ. This is confuted by what is said: Whether the world be animated by one universal soul, we are not now inquiring; but that God is not this informing soul, is before disproved. In point of efficiency, we grant that he is as the soul of souls, effecting more than souls do for their bodies, but not in point of constitution. He is much more than the soul of the world, but is not formally its soul; but, 2. Those men that will think so, must acknowledge, that as they take the horse and the rider to be both parts of God, and the child and the father, and the subject and the prince, and the malefactor and the judge, and the flagitious wretch, and the best of men, so it is no other membership than what consisteth with the difference of moral good and evil, of wise and foolish, of governors and subjects, of rewards and punishments, of happiness and misery, which are the things that I am seeking after. But so few lay this claim to Deity, that I need no farther mind them.

Sect. 3. My parents were not the first cause of my being what I am.

As each individual cannot be the first cause of itself, so neither can their parents; for they do not so much as know my frame and nature, nor the order and temperature of my parts, nor how or when they were set together, nor their use, or the reason of their location; and certainly he that made me, knew what he did, and why he did it in each particular. My parents

\[\text{a The Pythagoreans and Plato. So Balbus in Cicer. de Nat. Deor. 1. 2, and many more. But Cicero in other places speaketh of God, not as the soul of the world formally and constitutively, but only efficiently, calling him, "The Parent of the Universe," "The Maker of all things," &c. So that it seems that he took not God, \textit{pro formà mundi}, but as we do, for more than the soul of it, even the first efficient. And, "Lib. de Univers.," he supposeth the Eternal God to have created that God who is the soul of the world.}\]
could not choose my sex, nor shape, nor strength, nor qualifications.

Sect. 4. The world which I see and live in did not make itself. As men, and beasts, and trees, and stones did not make themselves, so neither did they join as concourses or assistants in the making of the whole, nor did any one of them make the rest; nor did any of the more simple substances, called elements, make themselves, neither the passive elements or the active, the earth, the water, the air, or the fire; for we know, past doubt, that nothing hath no power or action, and before they were, they were not, and, therefore, could not make themselves; nor can they be the first cause of mixed bodies, because there is that exceeding wisdom most apparent in the generation, production, nature, and operations of these bodies, which these elements have not.

Sect. 5. The visible world is not an uncaused, independent being.

For all the generated parts we see, do oriri et interire; they have a beginning, progress, decay, and end. And the inanimate parts having less of natural excellency than the living, cannot infinitely exceed them in the excellency of Deity, as uncaused and independent; and we see that they are all dependent in their operations. They show, in the order of their beings and action, that incomprehensible wisdom which is not in themselves; the earth, the sea, the air and winds, are all ordered exactly by a wisdom and a will which they themselves are void of: besides, they are many and various, but their order and agreement showeth that it is some one universal wisdom and will which ruleth them all; and if they are dependent in operation, they are certainly dependent in being; and had they that excellency to be uncaused and independent, they would have had therewith all other perfections, which we see they want; and they would not have been many, but one in that perfection.

Sect. 6. The first universal matter is not an uncaused, independent being.

If such there be, its inactivity and passiveness showeth it to want the excellency of independency; and the ordination of it into several beings, and the disposals of it there, is done by a principle of infinite power, activity, and wisdom: on which having this dependence in its ordination and use, it must be dependent also in its being.

God never wrought miracles to convince Atheism, because his ordinary works convince it.—Lord Bacon, Essay xvi., p. 87.
Sect. 7. If it were doubtful whether the world were eternal, and whether it were the body of God as the informing soul, yet it would be past doubt that it is not uncaused, or independent, but caused by God.\(^c\)

That the word is not eternal, we want not natural evidence; "For," saith Lullius,\(^d\) "then there would be two eternals, the cause and its effects, and then all things would be caused by natural necessity, and not by free will, and consequently always alike; and then there hath been evil eternally, and both the caused good and the evil would in all other aggravations be answerable to eternity, and the evil would be as soon, as great, as durable as the good. The same world which is finite in good and evil, and other respects, would be infinite in eternity, and the evil would have an infiniteness in point of eternity, and this necessitated, by the eternity of the world; and seeing no individuals are eternal, the supposed eternity of the world must be but of some common matter, or only intentional, and not real. The corporeal part having quantity, is infinite as to extension, and therefore cannot be infinite in duration. In eternity, then, there is no time, no prius et posterius; but in the world there is. Much more is said by many, but this is not my present task; I shall say more of it afterward.

But if it were doubtful whether the world were not eternally the body of God, yet would it be undoubted still that he caused it. And that there were the difference of a cause and an effect, in order of nature, though not in duration. As if a tree or a man's body were supposed eternal, yet the root and spirits of the tree, and the principal parts and spirits in man's body, would be the causal parts on which the rest depend.

Sect. 8. It remaineth, therefore, most certain that something is a first cause to all things else, and that he is the Creator of all things.

For if the world be not uncaused and independent, it hath a cause; and if it have a cause, it hath a Creator: for when there was nothing but himself, he must make all things of himself, or of nothing: not of himself, for he is not material, and they are not parts of God (who is indivisible.) He that thinks otherwise, should not kill a flea or a toad, nor blame any man

\(^c\) The Platonist's simile is, as the substance and shadow may be at one time, though one be the cause of the other; so here.

that beateth, or robbeth, or wrongeth him, nor eat any creature; because he doth kill, and blame, and eat a part of God, who is unblameable, and can injure none, and is to be more reverenced.

Sect. 9. If there were any doubt whether the sun, or fire, or passive matter had a first cause, there can be no doubt at all concerning man, which is the thing which I am inquiring into at the present.

For every one seeth that man hath his beginning, and confesseth that it is but as yesterday since he was not; and therefore hath a cause which must be uncaused, or have a cause itself: if the latter, then that cause is again uncaused, or hath a cause itself. And so we must needs come at last to some uncaused cause.

Sect. 10. If any second cause had made man or the world, yet if it did it but as a caused cause, itself would lead us up to an uncaused cause, which is the first cause of all, which we are seeking after.

For what any cause doth by a power received from a higher cause, and consequently ordered by it, that is done principally by that first or highest cause. And if God had made the world by an angel or intelligence, it would have been nevertheless his creature, nor any thing the less to his honour, than if he had made it by himself alone.

Sect. 11. The sum of all is, that there is certainly a first, uncaused, independent cause of men, and all things else beside that cause.

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CHAP. V.

What this Cause is in itself. That it is God.

Sect. 1. The first cause is known to us imperfectly, and by the effects.

Man is so conscious of his ignorance herein, and of the perplexities and diversities of opinions which follow thereupon, and of the necessity of beginning downward at the effect, and rising upward in his inquiry, that I need not prove this proposition to any man.

Sect. 2. Though God, or the first cause, is to be searched

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* Quid enim potest esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, cum caelum suspeximus, celestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen, praestantissimae mentis, quo hac regantur.—Ciccr. l. 2. de Nat. Deor.

* Esse igitur Deos perspicuum est: ut id qui neget, vix eum same mentis existimem.—Ciccr. de Nat. Deor. 2.

* Agnosceimus Deum ex operibus ejus.—Cic. 1. Tusc.
after in all his works, yet chiefly in the chief of them within our reach; which is man himself. h

If any shall say, that the sun and other creatures are more excellent than man, and therefore God, or the first cause, is to be searched after rather in them, and his attributes denominated from them: I answer, there is no doubt but, secundum quid, the sun is a nobler creature than man; but what it is, simpliciter, we cannot tell, unless we knew it better. The highest excellencies known to man in the sun, are the potentia motiva, illuminativa et calefactiva; motion, light, and heat, with their effects, do tell us what we know of it. That which we are conscious of in man is, posse, scire, velle, power, intellection, and will, with their perfections; which are an higher excellency than motion, light, and heat. i

Sect. 3. He that giveth being to all else that is, must needs be the first being formally or eminently himself.

Entity must needs be, in the noblest sense or sort, in the primum ens, the original of being, rather than in any derived being whatsoever; for it cannot give better than it hath. So that ens, or I am, is his first name.

Sect. 4. He that hath made substances more noble than accidents, is himself a substance, either formally or eminently; and a living substance, yea, life itself.

Once for all; by eminently, I mean somewhat more excellent, or transcendent, which yet man hath no better name for, or fitter notion of; God is thus a substance, life transcendently, if not formally.

Sect. 5. He that hath made intelligences, or spirits, or minds, more noble and excellent than bodies, is himself a mind, intelligence or spirit, either formally, or transcendently and eminently.

b Commoda quibus utimur, lucem qua fruimur, Spiritum quem ducimus, à Deo nobis dari et imperti videmus.—Cic. pro Rosc.

i Jovem dominatorem rerum et omnia nutu regentem, et præsentem et praepotentem, qui dubitat, haud saeù intelligo cur non idem, sol sit, an nullus sit dubitare possit.—Cicer. de Nat. Deor. 1. 2. p. (mihi) 48.

Tria sunt invisibilia Dei: h. e. potentia, sapientia, benignitas; à quibus omnia procedunt, in quibus omnia subsistunt, per quae omnia reguntur; Pater est potentia, Filius sapientia, Spiritus sanctus benignitas; potencia creat, sapientia gubernat, benignitas conservat (et perficit). Potentia per benignitatem sapienter creat: sapientia per potentiam beneigne gubernat; benignitas per sapientiam potenter conservat; sicut imago in speculo cernitur, sic in natura animar, &c. Huic similitudini Dei approximat homo: Cui potentia Dei dat bonum posse; sapientia tribuit scire, benignitas praesat velle: haec triplex animar rationalis vis est; scil. posse, scire, velle: qua supra dictis tribus fidei, spei, et charitati cooperantur, &c.—Potho Prumensis de statu Dominus Dei, lib. 1, in Biblioth. Pat. v. 9.
We find that corporeal, gross, and dense beings are dullest and most passive, and have least of excellency. The body of itself, in comparison of the mind, is a dull and dirty clod. Though we have no adequate conception of a spirit, we know not only, negatively, that it containeth a freedom from the baseness and inconveniences of corporeity, but also we know by its essential acts, that, positively, it is a pure, active life, intelligence, and will, and, therefore, a more excellent sort of being than things merely corporeal, which have no such action. So that we have found, as to his being, that the first cause is \emph{ens, substantia, vita, spiritus}. 

Sect. 6. There must needs be in the first cause an \emph{esse, posse,} and \emph{operari}. 

If there were no operation, there were no causation; if there were no power, there could be no operation; and if there were no being, there could be no power. Not that these are things so various as to make a composition in the first cause; but they are transcendently in it without division and imperfection, by a formal or virtual distinction.

Sect. 7. Seeing the noblest creatures known to us are minds that have a \emph{posse, sese, velle,} active, executive power, with an understanding to guide it, and a will to command it; God hath either formally, or eminently and transcendently, such a power, intellect, and will, which is his essence.

For nothing is more certain than that no cause can give more than it had to give: if the first cause had not power, understanding, and will, either formally or eminently in a higher and nobler kind, he could not have endowed all mankind with what he had not.

1. That the first cause is most powerful, is evident by his works: he that gave man his measure of power, and much more to many other creatures, hath himself much more than any of them: he that made this marvellous frame of all the orbs, and causeth and continueth their being, and their constant, rapid motion, is incomprehensibly potent. Whosoever power there is in all the creatures visible and invisible set together, there must be more, or as much in their first cause alone, because nothing can give more power than it hath.

2. His works also prove that the first cause is an understanding; for the admirable composure, order, nature, motion, variety, and usefulness, of all his creatures, do declare it. He that hath given understanding to man, hath formally or eminently more himself than all men, or all his creatures have. If
intellection were not an excellency above mere natural or brutish motion, man were not better than the inanimates or brutes; but if it be, the giver of it cannot want it. Not that his intellection is univocally the same thing with ours, but it is something incomparably more noble, which expresseth itself in human intellection as its image, and is seen by us in this glass, and can be expressed by us no better than by this name.

3. As it is a nobler nature which acteth by volition, or free-will, than that which hath no will at all, and so no voluntary choice and complacency; so the first cause which hath given this noble faculty to man, hath certainly himself, though not a will univocally the same with ours, yet a will of a transcendent excellency, which expresseth itself in ours as its image, and must be something better and greater, but cannot be lower or less. And though such indetermination as proceedeth from imperfection, and consequently such liberty, belongeth not to the first cause, which hath no defects, yet all that liberty which belongeth to perfection must undoubtedly belong to him. He that did what we see, hath done it willingly and freely.

Sect. 8. Whatever the first cause is, it must needs be in absolute perfection.

It must needs have in it more than the whole world besides, because it giveth all that to the whole creation which it hath received, and is. An imperfect cause could never have made such a world as we behold, and partly know; and were the first cause imperfect, there would be no perfection in being.

Sect. 9. The perfection of the first cause in being requireth that it be eternal, without beginning or end of duration.

Nothing in the world can be more evident to reason, than that something must be eternal, without beginning; nothing being more evident, than that nothing hath no power, no action, no effect, and so can make nothing. And, therefore, if ever there had been a time when nothing was, nothing could ever have been: imagine that there were nothing now, and it is certain there never would be any thing.

Deo nihil præstantius, ab eo igitur necesse est mundum regi. Nulli igitur est natura obedientis aut subjectus Deus: omnem igitur regit ipse naturam. Etenim si concedimus intelligentes esse Deos, concedimus etiam providentes, et rerum quidem maximarum.—Cic. de Nat. Deor.

Object. Something may oriri de novo without any cause, as well as God be eternally without any cause.

Answ. It is impossible: for he that is eternally hath all perfection eternally in himself, and needeth no cause, being still in being, and being the cause of causes. But nothing hath no perfection or being, and therefore needeth an omnipotent cause to give it a being.

Object. If the world may be created of nothing materially, it may be what it is without any thing efficiently.

Answ. Impossible: pre-existent matter is not necessary to the first created matter; for matter may be caused of nothing by an omnipotent efficient, as well as the wonderful frame of all things be made out of matter: but, without an efficient, no being can arise de novo.

So that it is most evident, seeing any thing now is, there hath been something eternally; and if something, it must needs be the first cause, which is chief in excellency, and first in order of production, and therefore of existence.

Sect. 10. The first cause must needs be independent in being, perfections, and operations; and so be absolutely self-sufficient. 1

For it were not the first, if there were any before it; and being caused by nothing else, it was eternally sufficient in and for itself; otherwise, that which it were beholden to would have the place of a cause to it. And if it caused not all, or needed the help of any other, it is not absolutely the first cause to all others, nor perfect in itself. That which could be eternally without a cause, and itself cause all things, is self-sufficient and independent.

Sect. 11. The first cause must needs be free from all imperfection of corporeity (or materiality), composition, passibility, corruptibility, mutability, and mortality, and all other imperfections of dependent beings. 2

There is such a thing as a living principle, and a pure, spiritual nature, in the created world; and the maker of it must be life and spirit in a higher, purer sense than it, and therefore must be free from all its imperfections; and having no cause,

1 Deus est mens, soluta libera et segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens, movens, &c.—Ciccr. 1. Tuscul.

2 Velleius (in Ciccr. de Nat. Deor. 1.) reciteth the opinions of many of the philosophers, of God (p. 10). Sed Deo (si Deus est) longum nihil omnino est, cui punctum terra est, et sub nullo omnia constituta.—Arnob. 1. 7. p. 63.
hath no defect; and having no beginning, can have no end: all this reason doth certainly apprehend.

Sect. 12. This perfect first cause must be immense or infinite in being.

Not by corporeal extension; as if God, as a body, were in a place, and, being more extensive than all place, were called immense; but in the perfect essence of an eternal life, and spirit, and mind, he is every where without locality, and all things live, and move, and be in him. The thought of space is but a metaphorical help to our conception of his immensity.

Sect. 13. Therefore he must needs be omnipresent.¹

Not by extension quantitative, but, in a sort, transcendent; and more excellent, according to the transcendent way of his existence: for if we must have conceived of him as no better than a body, and of magnitude as an excellency, we might well have concluded that he hath made nothing greater than himself; nemo dat quod non habet; and therefore he must be more extensive than all the world, and consequently absent from no part of it. Much more when his being, which surpasseth corporeity, directeth us to acknowledge a more noble kind of omnipresence than extensive.

Sect. 14. Therefore is he incomprehensible as to human understanding, or any other created intellect.

Of our own incomprehension, experience sufficiently convinceth us here, and reason evinceth the same of all created intellects; for the less cannot comprehend the greater, and between finite and infinite there is no proportion. We know nothing purely intelligible so easily and certainly, as that God is; but there is nothing that we are so far from comprehending; as we see nothing more easily and certainly than the sun, which yet we see not with a comprehensive, but a partial and defective sight.

Sect. 15. This infinite being can be but one.⁰

¹ Plato in lib. leg. Quid sit omnino Deus, inquiri oportere non censest.—Cicer. 1. de Nat. Deor.

² The wiser sort of the heathens believed one only parent of the universe, but durst not speak out what they knew of his unity or perfections. Cicer. saith, Illum quasi parentem hujus universitatis invenire difficile; et cum invenieris, indicare in vulgus, nefas.—De Universit. p. 2. And the same he saith,—Lib. 2. de Nat. Deor.

Stoici dicunt unum Deum esse: ipsumque et mentem, et fatum, et Jovem dicunt: principio illum cum esset apud se, substantiam omnem per aerem in aquam convertisse. Et quemadmodum in factu semen contineatur, ita et hanc serendi rationem in humore talem residisse, materia ad operandum aptissimæ
For if there were many, they could not be infinite, and so indeed there would be none, nor would there be any one first cause of all things; for if one caused one part of the world, and another, another part, no one were the first cause of all; and if they joined in causing all together, they would all conjunctly make but one first cause, and each one several be but part of the cause. If there be no one that is sufficient to make and govern all the world, there is no perfect being, and no God; but the effect showeth the sufficiency and the unity of the world, the orbs being one frame, the unity of the first cause. Perfection consisteth more in the unity of one all-sufficient Being, than in a voluntary concurrence of many beings. The most learned heathens, who thought there were many to be named gods, did mean but insubordinate, particular gods, that were under the one universal God, whom the stoics and academicians took to be the universal soul, and the subordinate gods, the souls of the particular orbs and planets.

Sect. 16. The power of this God must needs be omnipotency. He that hath given so great power to the creatures, as is exercised by them, especially the sun and fixed stars in their several vortices or orbs, and he that could make such a world of nothing, and uphold the being, and maintain the order and cause, and continue the rapid motions of all the vortices or orbs, which are to us innumerable, and each of incomprehensible excellency and magnitude, is certainly to be accounted no less than omnipotent: by his omnipotency, I mean, that by which in itself considered, *in primo instanti*, he can do all things possible; that is, which belong not to impotency, but to power, and by which, *in secundo instanti*, he can do all things which his infinite wisdom judgeth congruous and meet to be done; and, *in tertio instanti*, can do all that he will do, and are pleasing to him.

Sect. 17. The understanding of the first cause must needs be omniscient and infinite wisdom.

1. He that hath given so much wisdom to such a worm as man, must have more than all the men in the world. Whatever knowledge is in the whole creation, being given by him, parata, ex qua cetera post hac gignenterur. Tum genuisse primum elementa quatuor, ignem, aquam, aerem, terram. Videuntur autem illis duo esse rerum omnia principia, faciens videlicet et patiens: quod patitur sine qualitate esse substantiam materiam: quod autem faciat Verbum Deum esse quod in ipsa sit. Hunc enim quippe semperiterum per ipsum omnem singula creare.—Laert. in Zenone, pp. (mihi) 359, 360.
doth prove that, formally, or eminently, he hath more. Were it all contracted into one intelligence, it must be less than his that caused it. He hath not given more wisdom than he had to give, nor so much as he had, or is, himself. For if he should make any thing equal to himself, there would be two infinities, and there would be a perfect, self-sufficient being, which yet had lately no sufficiency or being, and there would be a being independent in facto esse, which was dependent in fieri: which are contradictions.

2. The effects in the admirable frame, and nature, and motions of the creation, declare that the Creator is infinitely wise. The smallest insect is so curiously made, and so admirably fitted and instructed to its proper ends and uses. The smallest plants, in wonderful variety of shapes and colours, and smells, and qualities, uses and operations, and beautiful flowers, so marvellously constituted and animated, by an unseen form, and propagated by unsearchable seminal virtues. The smallest birds, and beasts, and creeping things so adorned in their kinds, and so admirably furnished for their proper ends, especially the propagation of their species, in love, and sagacity, and diligence to their young, by instinct equaling, in those particulars, the reasonable creature. The admirable composure of all the parts of the body of man, and of the vilest beast and vermin; the quality and operation of all the organs, humours, and spirits. The operations of the mind of man, and the constitution of societies, and overruling all the matters of the world, with innumerable instances in the creature, do all concur to proclaim that man as mad as madness can possibly make him, in that particular, who thinketh that any lower cause than incomprehensible wisdom, did principally produce all this; and that by any brutish or natural motion, or confluence of atoms, or any other matter, it could be thus ordered, continued, and maintained, without the infinite wisdom and power of a first cause, superior to mere natural matter and motion. What, then, should we say, if we had a sight into the interior of all the earth, of the nature and cause of minerals, and of the forms of all things: if we saw the reason of the motions of the seas, and all other appearances of natures which are now beyond our reach: yea, if we had a sight of all the orbs, both fixed stars and planets, and of their matter, and form, and order, and relation to each other, and their communications with, and influences on each other, and the cause of all their wondrous motions: if we saw, not only the
nature of the elements, especially the active element, fire; but also the constitution, magnitude, and use of all those thousand suns, and lesser worlds which constitute the universal world; and, if they be inhabited, if we knew the inhabitants of each: did we know all the intelligences, blessed angels, and holy spirits, which possess the nobler parts of nature; and the unhappy, degenerate spirits that have departed from light and joy into darkness and horror, by departing from God? Yea, if we could see all these, comprehensively, at one view, what thoughts should we have of the wisdom of the Creator, and what should we think of the atheist that denies it! We should think Bedlam too honourable a place for that man that could believe, or durst say, that any accidental motion of subtle matter, or fortuitous concourse of atoms, or any thing below a wisdom and power, infinitely transcending all that with man is called by that name, was the first cause, and is the chief continuer of such an incomprehensible frame.  

Sect. 18. The first cause must needs be infinitely good.  

By goodness, I mean all essential excellency, which is known to us by its fruits and appearances in the creature; which, as it hath a goodness, natural and moral, so is it the index of that transcendent goodness which is the first cause of both. This goodness is incomparably beyond that which consisteth in an usefulness to the creature's good, or goodness of benignity as relative to man; and it is known better by the mere name, as expressing that which nature hath an intrinsic sense and notion of, than by definitions, as sensible qualities, light, colour, sound, odour, sweet, bitter, &c., are known by the name best, which lead to the sensitive memory, which informeth the intellect what they are; as the mention of things sensible entereth the definition of sense, and the mention of sense doth enter the definition of things sensible, and yet the object is in order of nature before the act; and as truth must enter the definition of intellecction,
and intellection the definition of truth, and yet truth is in order before intellection, and contemporary with the intellect, so is it between goodness and the will. But, if we speak of uncreated good, and of a created will, then good is infinitely antecedent to that will; but the will which is created hath a nature suited to it, and so the notion of excellency and goodness is naturally in our estimative faculty, and the relish of it, or complacency in it, is naturally in the will, so far as it is not corrupted and depraved: as if I knew a man that had the wisdom and virtue of an angel, my estimation calleth him excellent and good, and my will doth complacently cleave to him, though I should never look to be the better for him myself; or if I only heard of him, and never saw him, or were personally beholden to him.

That God is thus infinitely excellent and good, the goodness of his creatures proveth; for all the goodness that is in men and angels, earth and heaven, proceedeth from him. If there be any natural goodness in the whole creation, there must be more in the Creator; if there be any moral goodness in men and angels, there must be more in eminency in him: for he can make thing better than himself, nor give to creatures what he hath not.

Sect. 19. The goodness of the first being consisteth in this infinite perfection or excellency, containing his happiness, his holiness, and his love or benignity.

Sect. 20. The happiness of the first being consisteth, 1. In his being himself; 2. In his knowing himself; 3. In his loving and enjoying himself.

The most perfect being must needs be the most happy, and that in being what he is; his own perfection being his happiness: and as knowledge in the creature is both his perfection and delight, so the transcendent omniscience of the Creator must needs be both part of his perfection, as distinguished by our narrow minds, and such felicity as may be called eminently his delight,

* Deus est summum bonum, supra omne substantiam, omnemque natu-ram; quod cuncta expetunt, cum ipse sit plenae perfectionis, nullius societa- tis indigus.—Plato in Tim.
* Amor divinus fuit causa factionis mundi, et originis omnium rerum.—Id. ib.
* Bonus quidem Deus, et quidem Deus causa bonorum: malorum autem omnium non causa.—Idem. de Leg.
* Deus si vim spectes, valentissimus, si docorem formosissimus, si vitam immortalis, denique si virtutem praestantissimam est.—Aristot. de Mun. c. 6.
* Deus est actus illis porro actus qui per se est, et optimus et aeternus. Atque Deum animal esse et aeternum et praestantissimum dicimus. Vita igitur et aevum continuum et perpetuum Deo supputit: est enim hoc Deus.—Aristot. Metaphys.
though what God's delight is we know not formally: and as love or complacency is the perfective operation of the will, and so of the human nature in man, and is his highest, final, and enjoying act, of which all goodness is the object; so there must be something in the perfection of the first cause, though not formally the same with love in man, yet eminently so called, as known to us by no other name: and this complacency must needs be principally in himself, because he himself is the infinite and only primitive good; and as there was primitively no good but himself to love, so now there is no good but derived from him, and dependent on him: and as his creature (of which anon) is obliged to love him most, so he must needs be most amiable to himself. Self-love and self-esteem, in the creature, may be inordinate, and therefore called pride; but it is impossible that infinite goodness itself can be over-valued or over-loved by himself, or by any creature.

Sect. 21. The holiness of the first being consisteth, 1. In his separation from all creatures, by that transcendency which maketh him their end; 2. In the special perfection of his will, which willeth and hath complacency in that alone, ad extra, which is agreeable to his perfect nature and infinite wisdom; 3. And so being the fountain and rule of moral goodness to the rational creature.

The holiness of man consisteth, 1. In his separation from common uses unto God; 2. In the rectitude of his will, as habitually thus inclined and bent to moral good, and hating evil; 3. Whereby it is conformable to the governing will of God: and hence we may learn what holiness is in God, though not formally the same with that in man.

Sect. 22. The benignity and love of the first being is his essence or nature, as inclined to complacency in all created good; and to benevolence or doing good to creatures, freely and agreeably to his infinite wisdom.

The love of complacency to all created good is necessary in God, supposing the continued existence of that created good, which is the object; but it is not necessary that such created good do continually exist. The love of benevolence is also natural to God in this sense, that it is his natural perfection, as respecting the creature, to be used agreeably to his perfect wisdom; but the exercise of it is not necessary, because the being or felicity of the creature is not necessary, but it is acted freely, according as the infinite wisdom seeth it is fit, as to those ends to which all creatures are but the means.
Sect. 23. The first being must needs be the only ultimate end to himself, so far as he may be said to intend an end. ¹

God doth not intendere finem in defectiveness and imperfection, as the creature doth; he wanteth nothing, nor is he in via as to his felicity; but, eminently, he may be said to intend an end, as he maketh one thing a means to produce or attain another, and doth nothing disorderly, nor in vain, but ordereth all things in infinite wisdom. He is not wanting, but enjoying his end at all times, even in the midst of his use of means. To his essential goodness and blessedness there is no means; nothing is capable of the honour of contributing to it; but his will is the beginning of all derived beings, and his will is the ultimate end of all. He is pleased to make and order all by his power and wisdom, and he is pleased in all things as so made and ordered. The complacency of his will, then, is the ultimate end of all his works, as the glory of his own power, wisdom, and goodness shineth in them; and though complacency, or pleasure, or will, be not formally the same in God as in us, yet something eminently there is in him, which, under this notion, we must conceive of, and express.

Sect. 24. The posse, scire, velle, the operative power, understanding, and will of God, according to their perfection, called his omnipotency, omniscience, and goodness, by which he is maximus, sapientissimus, optimus, is a wonderful, yet an intelligible and certain trinity in unity, viz.: in the unity of essence there is this trinity of principles or faculties, as they may be called from the manner of imperfect man, but deserve a higher name in God.

Sect. 25. The essence of God is not the genus, and these three the species; nor is it the totum, and these three the parts; nor is it a substance, of which these three are accidents: but they are like the essential faculties in man, which are one with the soul

¹ Creatas autem potentias, creatrix utique potentia jure supereminent eo ipso vel maxime quo creavit. Nam et animam animâ præstantiorem sæpe et experimentur et dicimus.—Claudian. Mammert. de Anime Statu. 1. 1. cap. 15.

When I consider, that taking any one sound, if you join thereto another a third above it, and then place another a third above that also; these three, thus conjoined and sounding together, do constitute one entire harmony, which governs and compriseth all the sounds which, by art or imagination, can at once be joined together in musical concordance: this I cannot but think a significant emblem of that supreme and incomprehensible Three in One, governing, comprising, and disposing the whole machine of the world, with all its included parts in a perfect harmony.—Christoph, Simpson’s ‘Division Violist,’ p. 17.
in essence, but are not one and the same faculties, but truly distinct, whether it be really, formally, or relatively and denominatively only. God's power on omnipotency is not formally the same (quoad conceptum objectivum) with his understanding and wisdom, nor this the same with his will and goodness; they are as three essential principles, and yet but one essence, and so one God: nor is it part of God that is omnipotent, and part that is omniscient, and part that is good; or quae potest intelligit et vult; but the whole Godhead is omnipotent, the whole omniscient, and the whole is good, or power, wisdom, and goodness itself; yet each of these notions, by itself alone, is not a total or full expression of the whole perfection of the Deity.

Therefore, we must neither confound the essential principles in God, nor divide the essence. The omnipotency is as one faculty, the understanding another, and the will another; but the Godhead and essence of them all is one, the glory equal, the majesty co-eternal: such as the power is, such is the understanding, and such is the will. The power uncreated, the understanding uncreated, and the will uncreated; the power incomprehensible, the understanding incomprehensible, and the will incomprehensible; the power eternal, the understanding eternal, and the will eternal: and yet there are not three eternal Gods or essences, but one eternal; nor three incomprehensibles, nor three uncreated, but one. The power is God, the understanding is God, and the will is God; and yet there are not three Gods, but one God: so then there is one power, not three powers; one understanding, not three understandings; one will, not three wills. And in this Trinity none is in duration before or after other, none is greater or less than other; but the whole three principles be co-eternal together, and co-equal: so that in all things, as aforesaid, this Unity in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity, is to be acknowledged as undeniable in the light of nature, and to be adored and worshipped by all."

And because of the unity of the essence, these three may be predicated into the concrete of each other, but not in the abstract, because of their formal diversity; and so it may be said, that

"The reason why the heathens made gods of several virtues, was, because these virtues were most eminent in God, and by adoring them, men would learn to love and imitate them. Bene mens, pietas, virtus, fides consecratur manu: quorum omnium Romae dedicata publice templo sunt, ut illa qui habeant (habent autem omnes boni) Deos ipsos in animis suis collocatos putent.—Cicer. de Leg. 2. p. 210."
the power is an understanding or wise power, and the understanding is an omnipotent understanding, and the will a most wise and omnipotent will, and the power a good and willing power; but not that the power is the understanding, and the understanding the will, or the will is the power or understanding.

So as to their order, the power, as in itself considered as an active, vital power, is first in our conception, and doth, as it were, act by the understanding, and the understanding by the will, and in execution so go forth with the will, that the effect is immediately to be ascribed to it.

Sect. 26. Though all the divine faculties and principles are adumbrate (or made manifest) in the creation or frame of the world, yet the omnipotency is therein to us most eminently apparent.

It is infinite wisdom and infinite goodness which shine to us in this wonderful frame, but we first, and with greatest admiration, take notice of the omnipotency; to consider the innumerable number of the orbs, the multitude of the fixed stars, (which may be called so many suns,) and to think of their distances, magnitude, powers, orders, influences, communications, effects, &c.; and how many millions of these, for aught we know, there may be besides those which are within our sight, even though helped by the most perfect telescopes: it striketh the soul with unspeakable admiration at the power that created and maintaineth all this, when we think of the inconceivable, rapid, orderly, perfect, constant motions of all these orbs, or at least of the planets and circumjacent bodies in every vortex. All these thoughts do make the Deity, or first being, to be just to the mind as the sun is to the eye, the most intelligible of beings, but so incomprehensible that we cannot endure to gaze too much or near upon his glory.

Sect. 27. Whether the whole world be animated or inanimate; whether the whole have one constitutive soul or not; whether each orb have its particular soul or not, are things unrevealed, and beyond the certain knowledge of the natural mind: but it is certain that the first being is not the proper, constitutive form or soul of the world, but yet that he is much more to it than such a form or soul, even the total, perfect, first cause of all that it is, and hath, and doth.

He is not the constitutive form or soul of the universe, as it seems Cicero, with the academics and stoics, thought, because then the creator and the creature should be the same, or else
the creature should be nothing but dead, passive matter, and
then man himself, who knoweth that he hath a soul, would
either be God, which his experience and the consciousness of
his frailty forbid him to imagine, or else he should be a crea-
ture more noble than the universe, of which he is so small
a part, which his reason also forbiddeth him to believe.

But yet, that God is much more to the world than a consti-
tutive soul, is undeniable, because he is the creating cause,
which is more than a constitutive cause; and his continued
causation in its preservation, is as a continued creation; as in
man the soul is a dependent cause, which can give nothing to
the body but what it hath received, nor act but as it is acted or
empowered by the first efficient; and, therefore, though we call
not God the soul of man, because we would not so dishonour
him, nor confound the Creator and the creature, yet we all know
that he is to us much more than the soul of souls, for "in him
we live and move, and have our being;" so also it is as to God's
causation of the being, motion, and order of all the world;
God is incomparably more to it than its form, as being the total,
first cause of form and matter. To be the Creator is more than
to be the soul.

Sect. 28. The glory of all being, action, and order in the
creatures, is no less due to God when he worketh by means,
than when he worketh by none at all.¹

For when no means is a means, nor hath being, aptitude,
force, or efficacy, but from himself, he only communicateth
praise to his creatures when he thus useth them, but giveth not
away the least degree of his own interest and honour; for the
creature is nothing, hath nothing, and can do nothing, but by
him; it useth no strength, or skill, or bounty, but what it first
receiveth from him; therefore, to use such means, can be no
dishonour to him, unless it be a dishonour to be a communica-
tive good. As it is no dishonour to a watchmaker to make
that engine which showeth his skill, instead of performing all
the motions without that little frame of means; but yet no
similitude will reach the case, because all creatures themselves
are but the continued productions of the Creator's will, and the
virtue which they put forth is nothing but what God putteth

¹ Fas autem nec est, nec unquam fuit, quicquam nisi pulcherrimum facere
eum qui esset optimus.—Cicer. de Univer. p. 239.

² See 'Theophil. Antioch. ad Autol.' 1. 1. p in B. p. 128. Showing that by
God's voice speaking to Adam, is meant his Son.
into them; and he is as near to the effect when he worketh by means, as when without.

Sect. 29. Those that call these three faculties or principles in the divine essence, by the name of three hypostases, or persons, do seem to me to speak less unaptly than the schools who call "Deum seipsam intelligentem," the Father; and "Deum ut a se intellectum," the Son; and "Deum a se amatum," the Holy Ghost. For that in God, which is to be conceived of us by analogy to our essential faculties, is with less impropriety called an hypostasis or person, than that which is to be conceived by us in analogy to our actum secundi, or receptions.  

Sect. 30. And those that say the first faculty, omnipotency, as eminently appearing in the frame of nature, may therefore be said to be especially therein personated, or denominated, the creating power, speak nothing which derogateth from the honour of the Deity.

Sect. 31. Though we cannot trace the vestigia, the adumbration, or appearances, of this Trinity in Unity, through the whole body of nature and morality, because of the great debility and narrowness of our minds; yet it is so apparent, on the first and most notable parts of both, as may make it exceedingly probable that it runneth in perfect method through them all; if our understandings were but able to follow and comprehend that wonderful method in the numerous, minute, and less discernible particulars.a

I shall now give no other instance than in two of the most noble creatures. The soul of man, which is made after God's image, from whence we fetch our first knowledge of him, hath in the unity of a living spirit, the three aforesaid faculties of vital and executive power, understanding, and will, which are neither three species, nor three parts, nor three accidents of the soul; but three faculties certainly so far distinct, as that the acts from which they are denominated really differ, and therefore the faculties differ at least in their virtual relation to those acts, and

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a Sic Plato, Cum de Deo loqui esset animatus, dicere quid sis, non est ausus: hoc solum de Deo sciens, quod sciri qualis sit, ab homine non possit; solem vero ei simillimum de visibilibus solum reperit et per ejus similitudinem viam sermoni suo attollendo se ad comprehensibilium patefacit. Nam Deus qui prima causa est, unus omnium princeps et origo est. Hic superabundanti fœcunditate majestatis de se mentem creavit. Hæc mens que vís vocatur, qua patrem inspicit, plenam similitudinem servat authoris.—Macrob.

Nulla gens est tam immanueta neque tam ferrea, que nou etiamsi ignorant qualem Deum habere deceat, tamen habendum sciat.—Cicero 1. de Leg.
so in a well-grounded denomination. To understand is not to will; for I understand that which I have no will to, even against my will, for the intellect may be forced. Therefore, the same soul hath in it the virtue or power, both of understanding and willing, and so of executing, which are denominated from the different acts which they relate to. There is some reason in the powers, virtues, and faculties of the real difference in the acts.b

So in the sun, and all the superior luminaries, there is, in the unity of their essence, a trinity of faculties or powers: 1. Motiva, 2. Illuminativa, 3. Calefactiva; causing motion, light, and heat. The doctrine of motion is much improved by our late philosophers. When the doctrine of light and heat are so also, and vindicated from the rank of common accidents and qualities, the nature of the luminaries and of fire will be also better cleared. The sun is not to these powers or acts either a genus, a totum, or a subjectum. It is not one part of the sun that moveth, and another which illuminateth, and another which heateth: but the whole sun, if it be wholly fire, or ethereal matter, doth move, the whole illuminateth, and the whole doth heat; and motion, light, and heat, are not qualities inherent in it; but motion, illumination, and calefaction, are acts flowing immediately from its essence, as containing the faculties or powers of such acts.c

He that could write a perfect method of physics and morality, would show us trinity in unity through all its parts, from first to last. But as the veins, arteries, and nerves, the vessels of the natural, vital, and animal humours and spirits are easily discernible in their trunks and greater branches, but not so when they are minute and multiplied into thousands, so it is in this method.d

b Omnibus innatum et quasi insciptum est, esse Deos.—Id. de Nat. Deor. Nulla gens tam fera cujus mentem non imbuerit Deorum opinio.—Idem 1. Tusc.

c Dicunt Stoici Deum esse animal immortale, rationale, perfectum et beatum, a malo omni remotissimum, providentia sua mundum et quas sunt in mundo administrans omnia: non tamen inesse illi humana formae lineamenta: ceterum esse opificem immensi hujus operis, sicut et patrem omnium.—Laert. in Zenone, p. (umbi) 364.

I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend, Talmud, Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind.—Lord Verulam, Essay xvi.

d Multi de Diis prava sentiunt: id enim vitioso more effici solet: omnes tamen esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur. Nec vero id collocutio hominum aut consensus effect; non instituitis opinio est confirmata; non legibus: omnia autem in re consensus omnium gentium lex naturae putanda est.—Cicer. Tusculan. Qu. I. I. p. 220.

Cesarius, and some other of the ancients, make the image of God on man to be his natural perfections, and his similitude to be his moral perfections,
But I must desire the reader to observe, that though here I explain this trinity of active principles in the divine essence, which is so evident to natural reason itself as to be past all controversy; yet whether, indeed, the trinity of hypostases or persons, which is part of the christian faith, be not somewhat distinct from this, is a question which here I am not to meddle with till I come to the second part of the treatise: nor is it my purpose to deny it, but only to prepare for the better understanding of it. Of which more shall there afterwards be said.

Sect. 32. And thus, all creatures, and especially ourselves, declare that there is a first Being and Cause of them all, who is a substance, life, and spirit, or mind, an active power, understanding, a will, perfect, eternal, independent, and self-sufficient; not compounded, not possible, not mutable, corruptible, or mortal; immense, omnipresent, incomprehensible, only one, omnipotent, omniscient, and most perfect, most happy in being himself, in knowing himself, and enjoying himself; most holy, transcending all the creatures, of a perfect will, the fountain of all moral good, love or benign; having a trinity of essential, transcendent principles, in unity of essence, which have made their adumbration or appearance on the world: whereof, though he be not the constitutive form or soul, he is to it much more, the first efficient, dirigent, and ultimate final cause of all, that is, there is a God.

CHAP. VI.

Of God as related to his Creatures, especially to Man, and as his Owner.

Passing by all that is doubtful and controverted among men truly rational, and taking before me only that which is certain, undeniable, and clear, and wherein my own soul is past all doubt, I shall proceed in the same method secundum ordinem cognoscendi, non essendi. The word 'God' doth not only signify all that I have been proving, viz., the perfect nature of the first cause, but also of his relations to us his creatures: and therefore, till I have opened and proved those relations, I have done but part of my work to prove that there is a God.¢

¢ Read the proofs of the Deity, and of Providence, at large, in Cicer. de Nat. Deor., lib. 2., by Balbus.

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Sect. 1. God having produced man, and all the world, by his power, understanding, and will, is by immediate resultancy related to him as his Creator.

Though he made his body of pre-existent matter, yet was that matter made of nothing; and therefore God is properly man's Creator, and not his fabricator only: and a creature is a relation, which inferreth the correlate; a creator, as a son doth a father. This, therefore, is God's first grand relation unto man, which hath no cause to produce it but his actual creation, which is its fundamentum.

Sect. 2. This grand prime relation inferreth a trinity of grand relations, viz., That God is our Owner, our Ruler, and our Benefactor, of which we are now to speak in order.

That these three are justly distinguished from each other, is past doubt to all that understand what is meant by the terms. An owner, as such, is not a ruler or benefactor; a ruler, as such, is not an owner or a benefactor; a benefactor, as such, is neither an owner, nor a ruler. And the enumeration is sufficient: all human affairs, or actions of converse and society, belong to man in one of these three relations, or such as are subordinate to them, and mere dependents on them, or compounded of them. They are, in some respects, the genera, and in some, as it were, the elements of all other relations: and from the manner of men, they are applied to God, with as much propriety of speech as any terms that man can use concerning him. And he that could draw a true scheme or method of the body of morality, (or theology, for all is one with me,) would reduce all the dealings of God with man, which are subsequent to the fundamental act of creation, to these three relations; and accordingly distinguish of them all; yet in the mixed acts, (as most are such,) distinguishing only of the compounding elements (I mean, the interest of these three relations, as making up the several acts).

Sect. 3. A full owner or proprietor is called dominus in the strictest sense, and is one that hath a jus possidendi, disponendi, et utendi; a right of having or possessing, disposing and using, without any copartner, or superior proprietor, to restrain him.

The meaning is better known by the bare terms of denomination, through common use, than by definition. We know what it meaneth when a man saith of any thing, 'It is my own.' There are defective half-proprieties, of co-partners, and subordinate proprietors, which belong not to our present case. The word dominus et dominium, is sometimes taken laxly, as
comprehending both propriety and rule; and sometimes improperly, for government or command itself: but among lawyers it is most commonly taken properly and strictly for an owner, as such: but lest any be contentious about the use of the word, I here put instead of it the word owner and proprietor, as being freer from ambiguity.

Sect. 4. God is, \textit{jure creationis et conservationis}, the most absolute owner or proprietor of man and the whole creation.\footnote{Those writers who confound propriety and government under the word 'dominion,' and then bestow long and sharp disputes on the question, \textit{What is the fundamentum of God's dominion}, do but delude the ignorant; and exercise the patience or contempt of the intelligent.}

It is not possible that there should be a more full and certain title to propriety than creation and total conservation is. He that giveth the world all its being, and that of nothing, and continueth that being, and was beholden to no pre-existent matter, nor to any co-ordinate concause, nor dependent on any superior cause in his causation, but is himself the first, independent, efficient, total cause of being and well-being, and all the means thereto, must needs be the absolute owner of all, without the least limitation or exception.

It is not the super-eminency of God's nature, excelling all created beings, that is the foundation of this his propriety in the creature: for excellency is no title to propriety. And yet he that is \textit{unicus in capacitate possidendi}, that is, so transcendently excellent as to have no copartner in a claim, might by occupation be sole proprietor, in that kind of propriety \textit{secundum quid}, which man is capable of: because there is no other whom he can be said to wrong. But God hath a more plenary title by creation to absolute propriety.

Sect. 5. Therefore it belongeth to God to be the absolute disposer of all things: to do with them what he please; and to use them to the pleasure of his will.

Every one may do with his own what he list, except the propriety be but limited, and dependent on another, or but \textit{secundum quid}. Who should interpose, and any way hinder God from the free disposal of his own? not any copartner, for there is none; nor the creature itself, because it is absolutely his.

Sect. 6. Therefore, also, \textit{in hoc instanti}, antecedently to any further relation or covenant, it is not possible for God to do wrong to his creature, however he shall use it: because it is
absolutely his own, and he oweth it nothing: and where there is no debitum, there is no jus, and can be no injuria.

It is to be remembered that I speak not here of God, as now related to the rational creature as a rector and a benefactor, and as having declared his own will in his laws or promises to the contrary; but I speak of God only in the relation of a proprietor, simply in itself considered, and so of his absolute right, and not his ordinate will, as it is commonly called. No man need to fear lest God should deal unequally with himself, or contrary to that which true reason calleth justice. For God having made him rector of the world, hath, as it were, obliged himself, that is, declared his will, to deal equally with all men, and judge them according to their works: and so hath created a debitum et jus to man, which inferreth a certain justice on God's part. But, considering him only in this first relation, merely ut dominus absolutus, or proprietor, it is not possible for any thing that he can do to be an injury: and mere corporal pain (including no contradiction or error, as consciences' accusation of the innocent doth) could be no wrong: there being less appearance of reason to call it wrong, than for my burning my wood, or plucking a rose, to be a wrong: for it is not the pain of one that can make it an injury any more than the destruction of the other: where there is no jus, there can be no injuria; and where there is no debitum, there is no jus. My rose hath possession of its life, but no right to it: therefore, it is no wrong to destroy it. And yet in this, and in the killing of birds, and beasts, and fishes, and labouring my horse and ox in continual weariness and pain, my borrowed half-proprietor secundum quid, excuseth me from doing them any wrong: which God's absolute propriety will do much more unquestionably by him.

Sect. 7. Though all God's three essential principles or faculties, power, wisdom, and goodness, appear in each of his three grand relations, owner, ruler, and benefactor, yet each one of these hath most eminently some one of God's essential principles or faculties appearing in it; viz., his power most appeareth in his propriety, his wisdom in his rule, and his goodness or love in his benefits given us.

Therefore, propriety resulteth immediately from creation, as producing the creature as a creature; but so doth not government, as we shall see anon. And as omnipotency is the most eminent attribute in the creation, so is it in that absolute propriety of the Creator, acquired by it.
CHAP. VII.

1. Of Man’s Relation to God, his Owner.

Sect. 1. God being our undoubted, absolute Owner, it followeth, undeniably, that we are his own.

The relations are mutual, and the thing needeth no proof.

Sect. 2. Therefore, man being an intelligent creature, that can know this his relation to his Maker, is bound by nature to consent to it, and absolutely resign himself to the will, disposal, and use of his Creator.

For there is nothing more reasonable, than that every one should have his own: and the understanding of man should conceive of things as they are, and the will of man should consent to his Maker’s interest and right, or else it were most crooked, irregular, and unjust. Therefore, it must needs be the duty of every reasonable creature to bethink him, that God is his absolute Owner, and thereupon to make a deliberate, resolved resignation of himself to God, without any exceptions or reserves.

Sect. 3. Therefore, man should labour to know wherein he may be most useful to his Maker’s interest, (which is his pleasure in our perfection,) and therein he should willingly and joyfully lay out himself.

For it is undeniable that God should be served with his own, and that entirely, without dividing: for we are not in part, but wholly his.

Sect. 4. Therefore, no man can have any propriety in himself, but what is derived from his absolute Lord, and standeth in full subordination to his propriety.

For there can be but one full and absolute proprietor. I can have no other propriety in myself, but by derivation and trust from my Creator.

Sect. 5. Therefore, also, no creature can have any propriety in

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* Prima pietatis magistra natura est.—Cic.
* Omnii est Deorum vita beata, hominum autem quatenus in ea lucet quod-dam ejus actionis exemplar.—Aristot. Eth. 10. c. 8.
* Agri ne consecrentur Platon; assentior: qui his fere verbis uitur: terra igitur, ut focus domicilium sacrum omnium Deorum est: quocien ne quis iterum idem consecrato. Aurum autem et argentum in urbibus et privati et in fanis, invidiosa res est.—Cicer. de Leg. 1. 2. p. 245.
another creature, but only derivatively subordinate, \textit{et secun-
dum quid}.

No parent hath any propriety in his children, nor the most absolute and potent prince in his people, but as God's stewards under him; no, not in themselves, and therefore not in others. And a steward hath no propriety in his master's goods, but derivative, dependent, subordinate and improper, and only the \textit{usum fructuum}, and such possession as is necessary thereto, and such an imperfect propriety as will justify that possession.

Sect. 6. And as I am not my own, so nothing is properly my own which I possess, but all that I have is God's as well as I.

For no man can have more title to anything else than to himself. He that is not owner of himself, is owner of nothing. And we have not any thing, nor can have, which is not as much from God as we, and therefore is not as much his.

Sect. 7. Therefore, no man should repine at God's disposal of him, but all men should acquiesce in the disposing will of God.

For it is unreasonable and unjust to murmur at God, for doing as he list with his own, and using any thing to his ends.

Sect. 8. And, therefore, all men should avoid all selfish affections, and partiality, and be more affected with God's interest than their own.

For we are not so much our own as his, and our interest is not so considerable in comparison of his.

Sect. 9. Therefore, no man should do any thing for selfish ends, which is injurious to the will and interest of God, our absolute Owner.

Sect. 10. And, therefore, no man should dispose of his estate, or any thing he hath, in any way, but for the interest of his absolute Lord.

Sect. 11. And, therefore, all men should make it the very care and labour of their lives to serve the will and interest of this their absolute Owner.

Sect. 12. And, therefore, no man should prefer the will or interest of the greatest mortal man, or the dearest friend, before the will and interest of God.

Sect. 13. Nor should the public interest of states or kingdoms be pleaded against his will and interest.

But yet we must take heed how we oppose or neglect this last, especially, because the will of God doth take most pleasure in the public or common benefit of his creatures; and therefore these
two are very seldom separated; nor ever at all as to their real good, though as to carnal, lower good, it may so fall out.

All these are so plain, that to stand to prove or illustrate them, were but to be unnecessarily and unprofitably tedious.

Sect. 14. It being a God of infinite wisdom and goodness, as well as power, who is our Owner, his title to us is a great consolation to the upright.

For as he hath taught men (and brutes too) to love their own, it intimateth that he will not despise his own: and therefore his interest in us is our comfort.

Sect. 15. No man is capable of giving anything properly to God, but only by obediential reddition of his own: no, nor to man, but as God's steward, and according to our propriety, secundum quid, in respect to other claimers.

CHAP. VIII.

2. Of God's Relation to Man, as his Governor.

Sect. 1. God having made man a rational free-agent, and sociable, among sensible objects, and out of sight of his invisible Creator, and so infirm and defectible, it followeth, necessarily, that he is a creature which must be governed by moral means, and not only moved by natural necessitation, as inanimates and brutes.\[^k\]

The thing that I am first to prove is, that man's Creator hath made him such a creature, whose nature requireth a government, that he hath a necessity of government, and an aptitude to it.

By government, I mean, the exercise of the moral means of laws, and execution by a ruler, for the right ordering of the subject's actions, to the good of the society, and the honour of the governor.

\[^k\] Stoici dicunt mundum regi et administrari secundum mentem et providentiam.—Laert, in Zenone.

Note, that all Cicero's unanswerable reasons for the law of nature (lib. de Leg.) prove, that God governeth us by laws: for the law of nature is God's law, who is the Maker of nature.

Omnium quae in hominum doctorum disputacione versantur, nihil est profecto praestabilius, quam plane intelligi nos ad justitiam esse natos; neque opinione sed naturâ, constitutum esse jus. Id jam patebit, si hominum inter ipsos societatem conjunctionemque prospekeris, &c.—Cicer, de Leg. 1. p. 221.
I distinguish laws from all mere, natural motions and necessitation; for though, analogically, the shepherd is said to rule his sheep, and the rider his horse, yea, and the pilot his ship, and the ploughman his plough, and the archer his arrow, yet this is but equivocally called government, and is not that which we here mean, which is the proposal of duty, seconded with rewards or punishment for the neglects, by those in authority, for the right governing of those that are committed to their care and trust: so that it is not all moral means neither which is called government, for the instruction or persuasion of an equal is not such. Laws, and judgment, and execution, are the constitutive parts of government; but by laws I mean the whole kind, and not only written laws, nor those only which are made by sovereign rulers of commonwealths, which, by excellency, are called laws, but I mean the signification of the will of a governor, making the subject's duty; and determining of rewards to the obedient, and punishments to the disobedient; or, an authoritative constitution, de debito officii, præmii pænæ, for the ends of government: so that as parents, and tutors, and masters, do truly govern, as well as kings, so they have truly laws, though not in such eminency as the laws of republics. The will of a parent, a tutor, or master, manifested concerning duty, is truly a law to a child, a scholar, or a servant. If any dislike the use of the word, 'law,' in so large a sense, it sufficeth now for me to tell them in what sense I use it, and so it will serve to the understanding of my mind: I take it for such an instrument of government. The parts of it are: 1. The constituting of the debitum officii, or what shall be due from the subject; 2. The debitum præmii vel pænæ, or what shall be due to the subject, which is in order to the promoting of obedience; though as to the performances, obedience may be in order to the reward. Now, that man is a creature made to be governed by such a proper, moral government, I prove.

1. The several parts of government are necessary, therefore government is necessary: from all the parts of government to the whole is an unquestionable consequence. It is necessary that man have duty prescribed and imposed, else man shall have nothing which he ought to do. Take away duty, and we are good for nothing, nor have any employment fit for reason; and take away all reward and punishment, and you take away duty in effect: experience teacheth us that it will not be done, for a rational agent will have ends and motives for what he doth.
2. From the imbecility of our younger state, so weak is our infant understanding, and so strong our sensitive inclination, that if parents should leave all their children ungoverned, abused reason would make man worse than beasts.

3. From the common infirmity and badness of all the world; the wise are so few, and the ignorant so many, that if all the ignorant were left ungoverned to do what they list, they would be like an army of blind men in a fight, or like a world of men bewildered in the dark. What a confused, loathsome spectacle would the world be! And the rather, because men are bad, as well as foolish. Would all the sensual, vicious persons in the world be ordered like men, without any government, by such as are wiser than themselves?

4. From the power of sensitive objects, the baits of sense are so numerous, so near, and so powerful, that they would bear down reason in the most, without the help of laws: nay, laws themselves, even of God and man, do so little with the most, as tell us what they would be without them.

5. The variety of men's minds, and interests, and dispositions, is such, as that the world ungoverned would be utterly in confusion: as many minds and ways as men. No two men are in all things of the same apprehensions.

6. From the nature of man's powers; he is a noble creature, and therefore hath answerable ends to be attained, and therefore must have the conduct of answerable means. He is a rational free-agent, and therefore must have his end and means proposed to his reason, and is not to be moved by sense alone; his chief end, as well as his chief governor, being out of his sight.

7. The experience of all mankind constraineth them to consent to this: that man is a creature made for government. Therefore, even among cannibals, parents govern their children, and husbands govern their wives; and in all the rational world there are rulers and subjects, masters and servants, tutors and scholars, which are all governors or governed. Few men are to be found alive on earth, who would have all men, or any men, save themselves, ungoverned; otherwise, men would be worse to men, I say not than serpents, and toads, and tigers, are to one another, but than any of them are to men. Every man that hath strength and opportunity would make a prey of the life or welfare of his brother. Men's own necessity forceth them everywhere to set up governments, that they may not live as in
a continual war, in danger and fear of one another; nay, a war that is managed by armies is also ordered by government, because many must agree for mutual defence; but else every man would be against another, and they would be as so many fighting cocks or dogs, every one would fight or flee for himself; for fighting or fleeing, injuring and being injured, would be all their lives.  

He that denieth man to be a creature made for government, and, consequently, denieth God's government of the world, by moral, proper government, doth own all these absurdities, which elsewhere I have heretofore enumerated.

1. He denieth that there is a God: for to be God, includeth to be governor of the rational world.

2. He denieth that man oweth any duty to God or man: for where there is no government, there is no proper duty.

3. He denieth the justice of God: for justice is the attribute of a governor; that is, distributive justice, which we speak of; for commutative justice God cannot exercise towards man, because of our great inferiority to him.

4. He denieth all the laws of nature: for where there is no government there are no laws.

5. He denieth the virtue of obedience, and all other virtues concatenated with it: for where there is no government there is no obedience.  

6. He denieth that there is any such thing as sin, or any fault against God or man: for where there is no government,

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1 Si leges abrogantur et cuivis licentia faciendi quicquid voluerit data sit, non solum respub. pessum ibit, sed nec quicquam intererit inter nostram et ferarum vitam.—Demost. Or. 2. cont. Aristog.

Bonis legibus, honestorum studiorum æmulatione pia, temperans, justa, et re helliciæ præstans civitas redditur.—Dion. Halic. 1. 4.

Modestiam quandam cognitio rerum celestium affect iis, qui videant quanta sit etiam apud Deos moderatio, quantus ordo; et magnitudinem animi, Deorum opera et facta cernentibus. Justitia etiam, cum cognitum habeas, quid sit summi rectoris et Domini nomen, quod consilium, quæ voluntas; cujus ad naturam apta ratio vera illa et summa lex à philosophis dicitur.—Cicer, de Finis lib. 1. 4. p. 150.

m Fundamentum libertatis, fons æquitatis, mens et auimus et consilium, sententia civitatis posita in legibus.—Cic.

Atqui si natura confirmatum jus non erit, virtutes omnes tolluntur: ubi enim liberalitas? Ubis patriæ caritas? Ubis pietas? Ubis aut bene merendi de altero, aut referendæ gratiarum voluntas, poterit existere? Nam hoc nascitur ex eo quod naturâ propensi sumus ad diligendos homines, quod fundamentum juris est. Neque solum in homines obsequia, sed etiam in Deos ceremoniæ religionesque tolluntur, quas non metu, sed eæ conjunctione, quæ est homini cum Deo, conservandas puto.—Cic, de Leg. 1. p. 225.
there is no transgression. Both the vicious habits and the acts will have no more crime than the poison of a toad.

7. And then no man should forbear any act as sinful or criminal.

8. Nor should any persons reprove sin in others, nor exhort them from it.

9. Nor should any one confess any sin, or repent of it, because it is not.

10. Nor should any man ask forgiveness of any crime of God or man.

11. Nor should any man thank God for the pardon of his sin.

12. It will follow that there is no moral difference between men or actions, as good and bad, but all are alike, whatever they be or do.

13. He denieth all God’s judgments, and all his rewards and punishments; for these are all of them acts of government.

14. It will follow, that every man should do what he list.

15. And that all parents may forbear the government of their children, and all masters of their servants, and governors of their families.

16. It treasonably subverteth all kingdoms and commonwealths, and denieth that there should be any kings or subjects.

17. It denieth all human justice, because it denieth human government.

18. It maketh man a beast, who is incapable of moral government.

19. It maketh him far worse than a beast, as corruptio optimi est pessima: for a beast hath an analogous, improper government by man, but man must have such as moveth him rationally, according to his nature, or he must have none at all: and it would banish all order, duty, and virtue, out of the world, and make earth somewhat worse than hell, which is not wholly destitute of government.

20. But the best of it is, while it nullifieth right and wrong, it inferreth, that whosoever shall beat or hang the owners of this doctrine, do them no wrong, nor offend any laws of God or man: for if there be no government, there is no transgression; and if they are brutes, they may be used as brutes, who are incapable of titles, rights, inheritances, or of any plea as against an injury.

Sect. 2. Man being made a creature to be governed, it thence
followeth, that his Creator must needs be his sovereign governor,
as being only fit, and having, in his propriety, the only right. 1

1. A governor he must have; for there is no government, nor
governed, without a governor.

2. If there be ever so many inferior governors, there must
be some supreme; or else each one would be absolutely supreme,
and none inferior. But I will first prove that God is man's
Sovereign, and then show the foundation of his right, and of this
relation.

The only objection made against it consisteth of these two
parts. 1. That God moveth man effectually, per modum naturæ,
as an engineer; and that this is more excellent than moral
government. 2. And that moral government, being a less
effectual way, is committed to angels and to men; viz., kings,
and states, and magistrates, who are sufficient to perform it. 2

This objection confesseth the government of one man over
others, but denieth the government of God over man; and,
instead of it, substituteth his mere physical motion, or natural
government, such as a pilot useth to his ship. I shall, therefore,
against it prove, that not only man, but God, doth exercise this
proper moral government, by laws, and executions, and not a
physical motion only.

Sect. 3. I. God hath de facto made laws for mankind: there-
fore, he is their governor by laws.

The consequence is undeniable: the antecedent I further
prove.

Sect. 4. He that doth, by authoritative constitution of duty,
oblige man to obedience, doth make laws for him, and govern
him by laws: but God doth, by authoritative constitution of duty,
oblige man to obedience: therefore, he maketh laws for him,
and ruleth them thereby. 3

1 Mundus nominem regitur, estque quasi communis urbs et civitas hominum.
Cicero 2 de Finiib.

2 Nec solum jus à natura dijudicatur, sed omnino omnia honesta et turpia:
nam et communis intelligentia nobis notas res efficit; easque in animis nostris
inchoavit, ut honesta in virtute ponantur, in vitius turpia. Hac autem in
opinione existimare, non in natura pouvere, dementis est. Nam et nec Arboris,
neque virtus, quae dicitur in quo abutimur nomine, in opinione sita est sed
in natura.—Cicer. de Leg. 1. p. 225.

3 Rerum natura malè administrari non vult: et multorum dominatus et
principatus non est utilis: unus ergo sit princeps.—Aristot. lib. 11. Metaph.,
c. 10.

Quod in navi gubernator, quod in curru agitator, quod in choro praæceptor,
quod deique lex in civitate, et dux in exercitu, hoc Deus est in mundo.—
Aristot. de Mund. c. 6.
The major is not to be denied; for it only asserteth the name from the definition. The authoritative appointment of the *debitum officii*, obliging to obedience, is the definition of legislation, as to its first and principal act; which the appointment of the *debitum præmii vel pæna* followeth. And I think that the interest of mankind will not suffer him to be so erroneous as to deny the minor: I think, few will believe that there is no such thing as a law of nature made by the God of nature; or that there is no such thing as duty incumbent on man from God; and so no such thing as an accusing or excusing conscience. Few persons will believe that it is no duty of parents to nourish their children, or no crime to murder them; or that it is no duty for children to be thankful to their parents, and to love them; or no sin to hate, or scorn, or kill them. Few kings will believe, that it is no duty towards God, for their subjects to obey them, and no crime to rebel or murder them; and that conscience hath nothing to say against him for such things, that can but scepe the judgment and revenge of man: and few subjects will believe, that it is no crime for a prince to oppress them, in their liberties, estates, and lives: and few neighbours will think that he is innocent before God, who beateth them, or setteth fire to their houses, or murdereth their children or other relations. If man be under no duty to God, and if nothing that he can do is a sin against God, what a thing will man be, and what a hell will earth be! Deny the law of nature, and you turn men loose to every villany: and engage the world to destroy itself, and set all as on fire about their ears.

For if God only move us physically, there is neither virtue nor vice, good nor evil, in a moral sense: but what God moveth a man to, that will he do, and what he doth not move him to, he will not do: and so there being only motion and no motion, action and no action, there will be no duty and no obligation, and so no moral good or evil.

Sect. 5. II. If God should rule us only by physical motion, and not by laws, he should not rule man as man, according to his nature. But God doth rule man according to his nature, therefore not only by physical motion.\(^a\)

Otherwise man should not differ from inanimates and brutes. A stone is to be moved physically, and a brute by the necessitating objects of sense; but man hath reason, which they have

\(^a\) Est enim virtus perfecta ratio, quod certè in natura est.—Cicer. de Leg. 1, p. 226.
not, and he is a free-agent. And, therefore, though God concur to his physical motion as such, yet he must move him as rational by such objects, and such proposals, and arguments, and means, as are suited to reason. By presenting things absent to his understanding, to prevail against the sense of things present, and by teaching him to prefer greater things before less, and by showing him the commodity and discommodity, which should move him: God would not have made him rational, if he would not have governed him accordingly.

Sect. 6. III. If the way of physical motion alone is not so excellent and suitable as the way of moral government by laws also, then God doth not only move man physically, and leave it to magistrates to rule as morally. But the antecedent is true; therefore, so is the consequent.

God doth not omit the more excellent, and choose a lower way of government, and leave the more excellent way to man. And that the minor is true appeareth thus: the way which is most suitable to the object or subject of government is the most excellent way; but such is the moral way by laws; the other, beasts are as capable subjects of as men, and trees as either. Wisdom and justice are eminently glorified in the moral way; and omnipotency itself also appeareth in God's making of so noble a creature, as is governable by reason without force.

Sect. 7. IV. If God were not the sovereign Ruler of the world, there could be no government of men's hearts. But there is a government of hearts; therefore God is the Ruler of the world.

Man knoweth not the hearts of those whom he governeth; and therefore he can take no cognizance of heart-sins or duties, unless as they appear in words or deeds; and therefore he maketh no law for the government of hearts. But the heart is the man, and a bad heart is the fountain of bad words or acts, and is itself polluted before it endeavoureth the injury of others. He that thinks all indifferent that is within him, is himself so bad, that it is the less wonder if, being so indifferent, yea, so vitiated within, he thinks nothing evil which he hath a mind to do. He that thinketh that the heart is as good and innocent, which hateth his God, his king, his friend, his parents, as that which loveth them, and that it is no duty to have any good thought or affection, but only for the outward action's sake; nor any sin to be malicious, covetous, proud, deceitful, lustful,
impious, and unjust, in his cogitations, contrivances, and desires; unless as they appear in the acts, doth show that he hath himself a heart which is too suitable to such a doctrine. But Nature hath taught all the world to judge of men by their hearts, as far as they can know them, and not to take the will, which is the first seat of moral good or evil, to be capable of neither good nor evil. Therefore, seeing hearts must be under government, it must not be man, but the heart-searching God, that must be their Governor.

Sect. 8. V. If God were not the Governor of the world, all earthly sovereigns would be themselves ungoverned. But they are not ungoverned; therefore God is their Governor, and so the Governor of the world.5

The kings and states that have sovereign power through all the world are under no human government at all, though some of them are limited by contracts with their people. But none have so much need to have the benefit of heart government; none have so strong temptations as they, and no men's actions are of so great importance to the welfare or misery of the world. If the monarchs of the earth do take themselves to be left free by God to do what they list, what work will be made among the people! If they think it no duty to be just, or merciful, or chaste, or temperate, what wonder if they be unjust, and cruel, and filthy, and luxurious, and use the people for their own ends and lusts, and esteem them as men do their dogs or horses, that are to be used for their own pleasure or commodity. What is the present calamity of the world, but that the heathen and infidel rulers of the world are so ignorant and sensual, and have cast off the fear of God, and the sense of his government in a great degree; when yet most of them have some conviction that there is a God, who ruleth all, and to whom they must be accountable. What, then, would they be, if they once believed that they are under no government of God at all? If they should oppress their subjects, and murder the innocent, it would be no fault: for where there is no government and law, there is no transgression. No one forbiddeth it to them, and none commandeth them the contrary, if God do not; for the people are not the rulers of their rulers, nor give them laws: and neighbouring princes and states are but neighbours; therefore, if they should sacrifice peace and honesty, liberties, lives, and

5 What Cicero (de Leg. 3) saith, "That he must first learn to obey, who will learn to govern," is true in respect of obedience to God.
kingdoms to their lusts, no man could say, ‘They do amiss, to violate any sort of law.’

Object. But the fear of rebellions, and the people’s vindicating their liberties, would restrain them.

Answ. Only so far as they feel themselves unable to do hurt, as a man is restrained from killing adders lest they sting him; and the advantage of their place doth usually empower them to make desolations, if they have a mind to it: and great minds will not easily bear a popular restraint. And, indeed, the honester and better any people are, the more indisposed are they to rebel; and therefore tyrants may, with smallest danger and fear, destroy them.

Object. But their own interest lieth in the people’s welfare; and therefore there is no danger of such miseries.

Answ. Did Nero think so, that wished Rome had but one neck; that set the city on fire, that he might sing over it Homer’s poem of the flames of Troy? That ripped up his own mother, that he might see the place where he once lay? Did Caligula think so? Did Commodus, Caracalla, Heliogabalus think so? Did the Spaniards think so by the Indians, who are said by their own writers to have murdered in forty-two years’ space, no less than fifty millions of them? Did king Philip think so, who put his own son and heir to death by the inquisition? Besides so many thousands more in Spain, and the Low Countries, by that and other ways? How full of such bloody instances is the world! If it were a tyrant’s interest that kept him under some moderation to the people of his own dominions, it might yet possibly leave him a bloody destroyer of other nations in his conquests. The world hath not wanted men that think the lives of many thousands a little sacrifice to a proud design, or furious passion; and are no more troubled at it, than a Pythagorean would be to kill a bird. It hath had such as Sylla, Messala, Catiline, and the conquerors of Jerusalem, who, as Josephus saith, crucified so many thousands, till they wanted crosses for men, and place for crosses, besides great numbers famished.

Object. But if chief governors be under no law, they are under covenants, by which they are obliged.

\[Quae\ \text{lex est recta ratio imperandi atque prohibendi: quam qui ignorat, is est injustus, sive est illa scripta uspiam, sive nuspiam. Quod si justitia est obtemperatio scriptis legibus, institutisque populum, eti, ut idem dicunt, utilitatem omnium metienda sunt, negligent leges, easque perfetum, si poterit, is qui sibi eam rem fructuosam putabit fore. — Cicero de Leg. 1. p. 225.\]
Awn. What shall make their covenants obligatory to their consciences, if they be under no government of God? The reason why men's covenants bind them is, because they are under the government of God, who requireth all men to keep their covenants, and condemneth covenant-breakers; but if God had never commanded covenant keeping, or forbidden covenant breaking, they could never be matter of duty or sin; so that this doctrine, that God hath made no laws for man, and is not his Governor, doth leave all sovereigns from under the least conscientious restraint from any acts of cruelty or injustice, and tendeth to deliver up the world to be a sacrifice to their lusts, when it is the government of the universal sovereign that is their restraint.

Sect. 9. VI. If God have not the sovereignty over all the world, then no man on earth can have any governing power; but princes and rulers have a governing power, therefore the sovereignty is in God.

The reason of the major is, because kings can have no power but what they receive from some or other; there is no effect without a cause. And if they receive it, it is either from God or man as the original. Not from man, for the people themselves have no governing power to use or give, as to the government of commonwealths: for their personal power over themselves is of another species, and cometh short of this in many respects (as elsewhere I have proved); and if it were otherwise, yet they have nothing themselves but derivatively from God, as is proved before; and, therefore, they themselves must have their power from him, from whom they are and have all that they possess: but God cannot give that which he hath not himself, either formally or eminently: therefore, he hath governing power, formally or eminently, or else no prince, or man, or angel can have any, any more than they can have being or reason without him. And though his power be transcendent, his exercise of it must be according to the capacity of the subject, and, therefore, morally, by laws and executions. So that as all things else in the creature are derived, so is power. And as in beings, aut Deus aut nihil, is an undeniable truth, so as to governing power, or sovereignty, either it is primitively, supremely, and transcendentally in God, or there is none in any prince or parents: for if they have it not from him, they can have none at all.  

1 There is scarcely any thing that the world needeth so much as good governors, or that is a greater blessing to them: which Diogenes intimated when
Object. Governing by laws is caused by human impotency, because man is not everywhere present, nor of power to effect himself, in and by others, all the things which he commandeth: but were man omnipresent and omnipotent, as God is, he would make all men do well, and not command them to do it: therefore, it is so in the government of God.a

Answ. It is granted that man is impotent, and God omnipotent and omnipresent, and, therefore, that God could indeed do as is here intimated, even make all men do well, and not command it; but, 1. It is apparent, that, de facto, he doth not so. 2. And his wisdom, being more eminently to be manifested in the work of government than his omnipotency, doth show us, partly, why he doth not so, even because the sapiential way is more suitable to his ends and to the subject. Creation did most eminently glorify or manifest omnipotency; government doth most eminently glorify God's omniscience or wisdom, as our perfection or glorification will most eminently manifest and glorify his love and goodness: each attribute shineth most eminently in its proper work, and man's conceits must not confound this perfect order.b

Yet, let it here be noted, that all this while I meddle not with the controversy of the liberty of man's will, and so whether God's sapiential government by laws do operate also by necessity and physical causation, as the natural motions of the orbs, or the artificial motions of an engine. I only argue, that whether God thus operate by his government by secret necess-

he was to be sold, and bid the crier cry, "Who will buy him a master?" And when they asked him what he could do, he said, "He could tell how to command or govern men."—Laert. in Diog.

Cicero (de leg. 1.) proveth, that right is founded in the law of nature, more than in man's laws; "Because, else," saith he, "men may make evil good, and good evil; and make adultery, perjury, &c., just, by making a law for them. A cursed consequence, which the atheist cannot deny upon his principles.

a Cicero (de leg. 1.) proves, that right is founded in the law of nature, and not in man's laws. The reason, he says, is that men may make evil good, and good evil, by making a law for them. A cursed consequence, which the atheist cannot deny upon his principles.

b Quod si populorum jussis, si principum decretis, si sententias judicum jura constituerentur, jux estat latrocinari, jux adulterare, jux testamenta falsa supponere, si haec suffragiis, aut scitis multituidinis probarentur. Quae si tanta potentia stultorum sententiis atque jussis, ut eorum suffragiis rerum natura vertatur, cur non sauciant, ut quae mala perniciosaeque sunt habeatur pro bonis et salutaribus. Aut cur cum jus ex injuria facere lex possit, bonum eadem facere non potest ex malo. Atqui nos legem bonam a maiâ nulla alia nisi naturali norma dividere possumus.—Cicer. de Leg. 1. p. 223.
tation or not; yet it is most certain that he governeth morally, and useth the means of doctrine, laws, and judgments: which might consist with physical, necessitating efficacy in all that do obey indeed, if God's wisdom and man's freedom of will did infer nothing to the contrary. But, if it had been granted, that all God's government is by physical efficacy, it would stand good, nevertheless, that laws and judgment are part of the means which he maketh so effectual: but yet I shall go further in the next argument.

Sect. 10. VII. Experience satisfieth all the rational world, that there is, de facto, a course of duty appointed by God for men, which they do not eventually fulfil. Therefore, there is not only a moral government, which is effectual, but also, which is separated from necessitating efficacy.

They that deny this, and plead for physical government only, must affirm, that nothing is any man's duty but what he actually performeth, and that nothing is any man's sin which he doeth, or omittesth to do; that is, that there is no sin or moral evil in the world; for all that God physically effecteth is good; and they suppose him to have no law which commandeth any thing but what he physically effecteth, and he will not physically effect that which he forbiddeth. And if there be no such thing as moral evil or sin in the world, then no man should fear any, or avoid any. Let but a man leave any thing undone, if it be nourishing his children, defending his king, loving God or man, and he may thence conclude that it never was his duty; let him but do any thing that he hath a mind to, if it be killing father or mother, or his prince, or friend, and he may be sure that it is no sin because he hath done it, for if God forbid it not, it is no sin; nay, he may make it an effect of God's government: but this consequence is so false and horrid, that no nation on earth receiveth it, and cannibals themselves abhor it, who eat not their friends, but strangers and enemies.

Sect. 11. VIII. If God be not the Governor of the world by laws, then no man need to fear or avoid any thing forbidden by the laws of man, who can either keep it secret by wit, or keep himself from human revenge by power. But the consequent is false, therefore so is the antecedent.

The reason of the consequence is evident, because where no

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\*\* Stoici dicunt, sinceros esse sapientes, observareque et cavere sollicitè, ne quid de se melius quàm sit commendare putemur, fuco seu arte aliqua mala occultante, et bona quæ insunt apparere faciante, ac circumcidere vocis omnem fictionem.—Laert. in Zenone. \*\*
human revenge is to be feared, there no punishment at all is
to be feared, if God be no Governor of the world; but those
that can hide their actions by craft, or make them good by
power, need not fear any human revenge; therefore, they need
fear none at all upon the atheist's grounds. And if that be so,
1. How easy is it for cunning malice to burn a town, to kill a
king, to poison wife or children, and to defraud a neighbour,
and never be discovered. If this be so, then thieves, adulterers,
traitors, when they are detected, have failed only in point of
wit, that they concealed it not, and not in point of honesty and
duty. 2. And then any rebel that can get enough to follow him,
hath as good a cause as the king that he rebelleth against; and
if he conquer, he need not accuse himself of doing any wrong:
and then there will be nothing for conscience to blame any man
for, or for one man to accuse another of, but witlessness or
impotency. And then the thief must suffer only for want of
strength or cunning, and not because he did any wrong.

Sect. 12. IX. If there be no government by God, there can
be no true propriety but strength, and he that is strongest hath
a right to all that he can lay hold on. But the consequent is
false, therefore so is the antecedent.\(^2\)

The consequence is undeniable: for if there be no divine
government, there is no law but human, and no man can have
any right, besides strength, to make laws for any other whom-
soever. For if God have no government and law, he constituteth
no debitum vel jus, no dueness or right. And man can have no
right to govern others, if he have no governor to give any. If
God do give right to govern, he thereby maketh obedience to
that Governor a duty; and he that constituteth or instituteth
right and duty, governeth. And if God give men no right to go-
vern, they can have none. And then if strength be all their
title, any man that can get as much strength doth get as good
a title, and may seize upon the lives, the lands, and estates of
prince or people, and give laws to the weaker, as others before

\(^2\) As London now is.

\(^a\) Tutum aliqua res in mala conscientia præstat, nulla securnm. Putat
exam etiam non deprehenditur posse deprehendi: et inter somnos move-

Prima et maxima poenitium poena est peccasse: hæc et secundæ premæ
premunt et sequuntur, timere semper et expavesce et securitati diffidere.—
Id. Ep. 47.

Mihi laudabiliora videntur omnia, quæ sine venditatione et sine populo teste
fint. Nullum theatrum virtutis conscientiæ majus est.—Cicertm Tusc. 2.
p. 268.
gave laws to him. And so there will be utter contempt and misery be let in upon the world. As in the poet's description of the degenerate age, *Vivitur ex rapto, non hospes ab hospite lutus*, &c., reason would have nothing to say against strength: the great dog would have the best title to the bone. *Melior mihi dextera lingua est.*

*Sunt communia:* tu vince loquendo.—*Ovid. Met.*

The honest, poor, and peaceable, would have such a peace with thieves and strong ones,

*Cum pectore infirmo qua solet esse lupis.—Ovid.*

Sect. 13. If God govern not the world, then mere communities are incapable of right or wrong, and no man is bound in duty to spare his brother's life or state. But the consequent is false, therefore so is the antecedent.\(^b\)

By a community, I mean a company of men, that have set up no government among them: if God be not their governor, such have none at all, and so are under no moral obligation; for covenants themselves cannot bind, if there be no superior obligation, requiring man to stand to his covenants.

Object. Then God's covenants to man do not bind him.

Answ. Not at all, by proper obligation; as if it were his duty to keep them, and his sin to break them; for God is not capable of duty or sin. But yet, improperly, they may be called obligations, because they are the demonstrations of his will, which the perfection of his nature will not let him violate. It would be an imperfection, if God should break promise, though not a sin or crime; and therefore it is impossible for God to lie.

Object. But suppose we say, that man is under no other obligations than a beast; and that among men there is no proper right or wrong, duty or fault; yet men, by confederacies, without any other government, would settle rules for the safety

\(^b\) *Par et aequum legibus acceptum ferre debetis.—Demosth.*

Animal hoc providum, sagax, multiplex, acutum, memor, plenum rationis et consilii quem vacamus hominem, præcámara quâdatam conditione generatum esse à supremo Deo: solum est enim ex tot animantium generibus et naturis particeps rationis et cogitationis, cum caterva sint omnibus expertia. Quid est autem non dicam in homine, sed in omni caelo, atque terra ratione divinis, quæ cum adolevit atque perfecta est, nominatur rite sapientia. Est igitur quoniam nihil est ratione melius, eaque et in homine et in Deo, prima homini cum Deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem recta ratio est communis: qua cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum Diis dutandi sumus; quibus autem nunc sunt inter eos communia et civitatis ejusdem habendi sunt unde universus hic mundus una civitas communis Deorum atque hominum existimanda.—*Cic. de Leg. 1. p. 219.*
of cohabitation and converse; and, for love of themselves, would forbear wronging others. And this is all the law of nature that man hath above brutes.

Answ. Those confederacies would no further oblige them, than their interest required them to observe them. Still, by this rule a man is left free to kill wife and children, if he be weary of them; which no neighbour, being wronged by none, will seem obliged to revenge: still, he that is the stronger is left to do his worst, without fault, to seize upon other men's estates, and to depose kings and destroy them; and all the world would be in a state of war: or, if self-interest keep some quiet for a time, it would be but till they had strength and opportunity to do otherwise. He is not fit for human society, who would tell all about him, 'I think myself free to defraud and murder any of you, as soon as my own safety and interest will allow me.' And no man, that thus taketh a man for a beast, can expect any better usage than a beast himself, any further than self-love shall restrain others from abusing him: nor can he plead any better title to his estate, nor exemption from the violence of the stronger. And it will also follow, that honesty is nothing but self-preserving policy; and that blasphemy and impiety against God need not be feared or avoided; nor any thing as a fault, but only as a folly, exposing the person himself to danger. Incest, perjury, lying, might be imprudencies, but not any crimes.

Object. If you supposed them in God, they would be but imperfections, and not crimes; and why should you judge otherwise of them in man.

Answ. Because the absolute perfection of his nature is instead of a law to God, who hath no superior. But man hath a superior, and hath an imperfect nature, which is, therefore, to be regulated by the wisdom and will of that perfect superior.

And, moreover, if man have reason and wisdom above a beast, which make him capable of knowing right and wrong, and of being moved by the things that are evident to reason, though not to sense; and if he be made to be governed by laws, as was proved before, then he is certainly governed accordingly; or else his nature and reason were given him in vain, which could not be by the most wise Creator.

Object. God governeth the world as the soul governeth the body which is, rationally, ex parte animae; but not by giving reason or laws to the body; but, despotically, by the natural power of the will.
A sw. The flesh is not capable of laws, as having no reason; and therefore no proper laws can be given to it in itself by the soul: but the soul is capable of reason, and made to be moved by proposed reasons in a law, and not only by natural force as the flesh. The government must be agreeable to the capacity of the subject. Though the rider rule the horse by a bridle and spur, and not by a law, it followeth not that the king must not rule the rider so. The soul and body constitute one suppositum, or man: and therefore the body is governed by a law, because the soul is so, which despotically moveth it. Laws are for distinct individuals, and not for one part of an individual to give to another part.

Object. If God be the constitutive soul of the world, then he need not give it laws.

A sw. Because it is most certain, de facto, that he doth give us laws, therefore it is certain that he is not the constitutive soul of the world, as is also further proved before, though he be much more to it than a soul.

Sect. 14. XI. If man act, per media propter finem, and both discerned by reason, then he must be ruled by a law. But the antecedent is sure: Ergo, &c.

For the end is ever something apprehended sub ratione boni (and the ultimate end, sub ratione optimi possibilis): and the means are chosen and used, sub ratione conducibilis, as apt to attain the end. This means and end are not to be discerned only by sense and imagination, as in brutes every object is apprehended but by reason; this reason is defectible and liable to error, and therefore the rational evidences must be proposed to it, and that conveniently; for he that knoweth not reason why he should choose, refuse, or act, cannot do it rationally: and the will being as apt to be seduced by the sense, hath need of due motives to determine it.

Therefore there is need of the regulation of a law, containing the direction of a superior wisdom, with authority and motives of consequential good or evil, proposed by one that can accomplish it.

But the whole world doth so universally consent that there is a difference between right and wrong, duty and crimes, good and evil, and so a necessity of some government, human at

*Non potest consistere respublica, ubi non est honos virtuti, nec poena scelerosis.—Demosth.*
least, and that man is not like the beasts, where strength is the only title, and good and evil is but natural, called *jucundum et utile*, with their contraries, that I need not plead that part of the cause any further; universal consent not only making it unnecessary, but also being a valid argument against it, as proving that it is against the common reason of mankind and light of nature.

Sect. 15. XII. If God be not the universal Governor of the world, then error, malice and tyranny, and selfishness, will make injustice finally prosperous, and oppressed innocency remediless. But that cannot be, as shall hereafter be more fully made appear.

There must be some infallible judge to pass the final sentence, and hear all causes, as it were, over again; and some perfect, righteous judge to set straight all that men's unrighteousness made crooked, or else unrighteousness will finally prevail: and this must be God, who, being the fountain of all government, is also the end of all.

Sect. 16. XIII. If God be not the supreme, universal Governor, there can be no unity and harmony in the moral order and government of the world.

As all the corporations in the kingdom would be in continual discord with one another, if they were not all united in one king; so would all the kingdoms of the world, much worse than they are, if they were not under the government of one God.

Sect. 17. XIV. The last argument shall be à *jure et aptitudine*. If a man be made a creature to be morally governed, and the undoubted right and aptitude for supreme government be in God alone, then God is actually the supreme Governor of the world: but the antecedent is true, therefore the consequent.

1. That God only is able, is undeniable: men can govern but their particular provinces or empires; and none of them is capable of governing all the world, for want of omnipresence, omnipotency, and omniscience: and, therefore, the pope that claimeth the government of all the world, if all turn Christians, doth, thereby, pretend to a kind of deity. And if angels were proved able to govern the earth, it can be but as officers, and not in absolute supremacy: for who then shall be the governor of them: their being is merely derivative and dependent; and therefore so must be their power. God only is all-sufficient, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, and most excellent: sufficient to give perfect laws to all; to execute righteous judgment upon
all; and to protect the world as his dominion: when princes cannot protect one kingdom, nor themselves. d

And God's title and right is as undoubted as his power: for he is absolute owner of the world. And who should claim sovereignty over him, or without him, where he is sole proprietor. He hath undoubted right to rule his own.

Object. Propriety among men is no title to government.

Answ. Absolute propriety in a governable creature is a plenary title. But no man hath absolute propriety in another. Yet parents, and the masters of slaves, who come nearest it, have an answerable power of governing them. But man's fullest propriety is in brutes and inanimates, which are not creatures capable of government.

Sect. 18. The relation, then, of sovereign King or Rector in God to man, is founded in the fore-named relation of a Proprietor; supposing the aptitude of the subject and the owner.

Having proved that God is the universal King, I come to show his title to his kingdom. Titulus est fundamentum juris. Sovereignty, or summa potestas, is jus supremi regiminis. Where this right is founded, great ignorance hath made a great controversy, the thing, to men that are of competent understandings in such subjects, being most easy and past controversy. God having made man, is immediately his Owner, because his Maker. Having made him a rational free-agent, and so to be governed, he hath the jus regendi by immediate resultancy from his absolute propriety; supposing the nature of the creature, and the perfection of the Creator alone, which so qualify one to be a subject, and the other to be the governor, that they are as it were the more remote fundamentum relationis. From the being of man, hoc aliquid a Deo creatum, resulteth the propriety of God: from the specific nature of man, as a rational, free, sociable creature, he is by immediate resultancy gubernandus; and being such, his Creator, remotely, for his infinite perfections and sole aptitude, and, proximately, because he is man's absolute Owner, is by resultancy his rightful Governor: and that he neglecteth not this his right, but actually governeth him, appeareth in the very making man such, and continuing him such as is made to be governed; as also in his actual laws and

d Atticus (in Cicer. de leg. 1. p. 213,) said, that he cannot but believe that jus est ortum ex natura, because of these principles. 1. Quasi numeribus Deorum nos esse instructos et ornatos. 2. Utam esse hominum inter ipsos vivendi parem communicemque rationem. 3. Omnes inter se naturali quàdam indulgentiâ et benevolentiâ, tum etiam societate juris contineri.
judgments. This is the true and plain resolution of the question of the title of God to his kingdom, or fundamentum of the relation of universal King. e

Sect. 19. Human government is an ordinance of God, and human governors are his officers, as he is supreme: and he hath not left it free to the world, whether they will live in governed societies, or not.

That human government is appointed by God, appeareth thus: 1. In that the light of nature teacheth it to all the world: 2. In that God hath put into man’s nature a necessity of it, and therefore signified his will concerning it. It is needful to the very lives of men, and to their highest perfections, order, and attainments. If parents did not govern children, and teachers their scholars, and masters their servants, and princes their subjects, the world would be as a wilderness of wild beasts, and men would not live like men, according to their natural capacities: I deny not, but some one, or few, by necessity, or some extraordinary circumstances, may be exempted from this obligation, by being incapable of the benefit; being cast into a wilderness, or such like place, where the benefit of government is not to be had; but that is nothing to the more common case of mankind. As marriage is indifferent to those individuals that need not the benefit of it; but it is not lawful for the world of mankind to forbear procreation, to the extinction of itself.

Sect. 20. Therefore, as all rulers receive their power from him, and hold it in dependence on him; so must they finally use it for him, even for his will and interest, which they must principally intend.

He that is the original of power must needs be the end. He that giveth it to man, doth give it for the accomplishment of his own will. It is held in pure subordination to him, and so it must be used, or it is abused.

Sect. 21. Therefore, no man can have any power against God, or his laws or interest: for he giveth not power against himself.

That is, he giveth no man right, authority, or commission, to displease him, by the breaking of his laws; for that is a con-

e See this more fully proved in my 'Political Aphorisms;' (p. 52,) &c.

Videtis magistratus hanc esse vim, ut præsit, præscribatque recta et utilia, et conjuncta cum legibus: ut enim magistratibus leges, ita populo præsunt magistratus: verqué dicit potest, magistratum esse legem loquentem, legem autem mutum magistratum.—Cicer. de Leg. 3. int.
tradition, or chargeth his laws with contradiction. Yet must not any subjects make this a pretence to deny any just obedience to their rulers, or to rebel against them, on supposition that their government is against God. For as private men are not made public judges of the interest of God, but only private discerners, in order to their own obedience to him; so may that government be for God, in the main, which is against him in some few particulars.

Sect. 22. The highest duty of man is to Him who is the Highest, and the greatest crime is that which is committed against the greatest authority.

This is, suá luce, so evident, that it needs no proof; formally, the chief obedience is due to the chief governor: (to a king rather than to a justice of peace or constable:) and, consequently, the greatest sin is against him. If God be above man, so is duty to God, and sin against God, the greatest in both kinds.

Sect. 23. Therefore, there are good and evil which respect God, and are called holiness and sin, which are incomparably greater than good and evil, so called from respect to any creatures, whether individuals or societies. 

Therefore, they that know no good, but that which is so called from its respect to man's commodity or benefit, nor any evil but that which is so called from its respect to the hurt of creatures, do not know God, nor his relation to his works; but make gods of themselves, and accordingly judge of good and evil.

Sect. 24. The consciences of men do secretly accuse them, or excuse them, according to this sort of good or evil.

When men have wrangled against religion ever so long, there are very few so blind and bad, in whom God hath not a resident witness, called conscience, which secretly telleth a man that he doeth well or ill, as he keepeth or breaketh the law of nature; and that with respect to the sovereign Lawgiver, and

Read what is after cited out of Zeno. Laert. (in Zen.) saith that the Stoics say, Virtutes sibi invicem esse connexas, ut qui unam habuerit, omnes habet: esse enim illarum communes speculationes, &c. Qui enim probus est, ea despicere et agere quæ sint agenda; quæ vero facienda sint, ea et eligenda esse, et sustinenda, et distribuenda, et perseveranter tenenda: sequuntur autem prudentiam consiliorum maturitas et intelligencia; temperantium vero ordinis dextera et ornatus; justitiam autem æquitas et gratitudo: fortitudinemque constantia, atque valentia. Placet autem eis, nullo inter virtutem et virtutem esse medium. Quemadmodum enim lignum aut distortum aut rectum oportere esse aint, ita justum vel injustum — At virtutem Chrysippus quidem amitti posse, Cleanthes verò non posse ait.
not only to the good or hurt of man. As conscience doth not accuse a man for being poor or sick, or wronged by another, (though about these we may have also an inward trouble,) so it doth not justify him for his prosperity in the world, though it may be laid asleep and quieted by such means. But it is for moral good or evil that conscience doth accuse or justify: if I make myself poor wilfully, my conscience will trouble me for the wilful fault, and breed in me repentance and remorse; and so it will if I hurt or impoverish my neighbour: but if I hurt myself or neighbour unavoidably, without any fault of mine, I am sorry for it, but my conscience will not accuse me or condemn me for it.

Sect. 25. This power of conscience causeth all the world to praise or dispraise men, according to this moral good or evil.

Mark but the infidels themselves, or any whom vice hath turned into monsters, and they will commend men upon the account of that inward sincerity and honesty, which God only can make laws for: and dispraise men for the contrary. If you say, that they do this only because such virtues make men fit for human converse, and profitable, or not hurtful to one another; I answer, we are not inquiring of the final cause, but the formal: though they praise sincere and honest men, and those that are loving, compassionate, and kind, and dispraise dissimlers, malicious, and men of hurtful dispositions, yet you may observe that they speak not of these only as useful or hurtful qualities, but as moral good or evil; as things that men ought or ought not to do; which they are bound to do or not do by some obligation: and what obligation can make it any man's duty, if there be no law of God in nature for it, when it is out of the reach of the laws of men. Mark heathens, and infidels, and atheists, in their talk, and you shall hear them praise or dispraise men for some things which intimate a divine obligation; which showeth that the conscience of the world beareth witness to the supreme, universal government of God.

No man who believeth that there is a God, can believe that the actions of his rational creatures have no relation to him, or that the good or evil of them, which is the result of their relation to God, can be of less or lower consideration than their relation to themselves, or one another; therefore, if it be laudable to

*Cicero, de leg. 1. p. 222.
perform duty to kings, and parents, and neighbours, conscience will tell the world that it is incomparably more necessary to perform our duty to God; and it cannot be that the world should stand related to God as their Creator, Proprietor, Governor, and End, and yet owe him no duty.

Sect. 26. God's government (as man's) consisteth of three parts; legislation, judgment, and execution.

Without laws, the subject can neither know his duty nor his rewards and punishments; without judgment, laws will be ineffectual; and without execution, judgment is a deceitful, ludicrous thing.

Sect. 27. By a law, I mean, an authoritative institution, what shall be due from and to the subject for the ends of government; or, a sign of the ruler's will, instituting what shall be due to and from the subject for the ends of government.

The fuller reasons of this definition of a law I have given in another writing. *Signum* is the genus of it; the will of a ruler being no otherwise to be known to subjects, but by signs: the relation of ruler, and subjects, is presupposed. It is, therefore, only an authoritative sign, or the sign of a ruler's will, because a ruler only hath the power of government: I say of his will, as that which is the nearest, perfect efficient, or imperant faculty, including the understanding's conduct. I call it an institution, or instituting sign, to signify its efficiency *de debito*, and to distinguish it from the judicial, decisive determination of the ruler. It is only to subjects that this signification is made, he being not a ruler to any others. The product of the institution, or *statutum*, is only *debitum*, which is the immediate, full effect of laws. This *debitum* is twofold: 1. *Officium*, what shall be due from the subject, or what shall be the subject's

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1 Legibus et earum observantia exoriantur omnia.—Demosth.
Nihil omnino neque pulchrum neque decorum repertor potest; quod non cum lege aliqaa communicet.—Id. Orat. 1. cont. Arist.
Lex nihil aliud est, quam recta et a numine Deorum ratio, imperans honesta, prohibensque contraria.—Cicero, Phil. 1.
Vitiorum emendatrixem legem esse oportet, commendatricemque virtutem: ab ea enim vivendi doctrina ducitur.—Cicero de leg.
Ad salutem civium, civitatemque incolunmatatem, vitamque hominum et quietam, et beatam, conditum sunt leges.—Cicero 1. de leg.
A majoribus nostris nulla alia de causa leges sunt inventae, nisi ut suos eives incolunmas conservarent.—Cicero in Fat. 
Nil est tam aptum ad jus conditionemque naturae sine quo nec domus ulla, nec civitas, nec gens, nec hominun universum genus, stare, nec rerum natura omnis, nec ipse mundus potest. Nam et hic Deo pareat, et huic obediunt maria terraque et hominum vita jussis supremae legis obtemperat.—Cicero. de leg. 3. pp. 253, 254.
duty. 2. What shall be due to him, 1. If he keep the law, which is the debitum premii; 2. If he break it, which is the debitum paene. I say to the ends of government, for it is a relation which must have the end in the definition; and seeing I only define a law in genere, I mention but the ends of government in genere, for several governments have several ends. The government of single persons only, as of a scholar, a son, a servant, by a tutor, parent, master, intendeth, proximately, but the good of the individual subject: the mandates of such rulers have the true nature of a law, though it be of the lower sort, as is the government; and custom hath appropriated the word law to a nobler species only. The government of societies is always immediately for the order of the society, but not always for their good, much less chiefly: the government of a society of slaves (as the Spaniards over the Peruvians and Mexicans, in digging their mines) is for the order of those slaves, but for the benefit of the lords. The government of some armies is for the order of the armies, but for the good of those they fight for: the government of a true commonwealth is for the bonum publicum, the common good, which includeth the happiness of the rulers with the subjects. The universal government of the world is, proximately, for the order of the world and for its good; but, ultimately and principally, for the fulfilling and pleasing the will of God in the said order and good, and in the glory or operations of his own power, wisdom, and goodness therein, as shall be further proved afterwards.

Sect. 28. Any signification of the will of God, that man shall be benefited on condition of his obedience, is the premiand part of his law; and any signification of his will, that man shall be punished if he sin, or that punishment shall be his due, is the penal part of his law.

If it only foretold, that, in a way of physical efficiency, obedience will produce good, and disobedience hurt to himself, this were not properly premiand, or penal; but when the good is promised upon the condition of obedience, and the hurt threatened upon condition of sin, as means to move a rational, free agent to obey, this is truly a premiand and penal act of law: and this is fulfilled also in a physical way of production; the Lawgiver being also the Creator and Disposer of all the world, doth wisely order it, that moral good shall be attended with physical good, and moral evil with physical evil, first or last.

Sect. 29. The immensity (or omnipresence), the omnipotency,
omniscience, and infinite goodness, of God, with his total causa-
tion in the support of all his creatures, do most undoubtedly
prove his particular providence, in observing and regarding all
the actions of his subjects in the world, and so declare his
actual government.\footnote{Of this read \textit{Cicer. 2. lib. de nat. Deor.}}

It is the gross ignorance of the divine perfections, which ever
made any one question the particular providence of God as
extending to the smallest things and actions: 1. It is proved
by his immensity (conceived of as without corporeal extension
of parts, as before said). He that made and upholdeth all the
world, did never make that which is greater than himself, and
excludeth his presence. Though being a Spirit, he hath not
corporeal quantity; yet, analogically, and in a way of eminency
and transcendency, we must say that he is greater and immense:
and it is his perfection which denieth extension and dimensions;
and, therefore, in a nobler kind, he is everywhere present. And
if he be here as certainly as I am, and in a more excellent
manner, he cannot but observe all things and actions which are
here.

2. He is omnipotent and all-sufficient, and therefore as able
to observe and govern every smallest thing and action, as if
he had but that one to look after in the world. And I think, if
God had but one man at all to mind and govern in all the world,
the adversary himself, that now denieth his particular provi-
dence, would confess that God doth observe and regard that one
individual. It is men's atheistical or blasphemous diminutive
thoughts of God, who conceive of him as finite, though they call
him infinite, which is the cause of all such kind of errors.

3. His omniscience infallibly proveth also his particular ob-
servance of all things and actions in the world; for his know-
ledge, being his natural perfection, is necessary; he cannot be
ignorant of any thing that is. If I had but one thing just before
my eyes to see, in the open light, I must needs see it, if it have
the necessaries of a visible object, unless I wink. If the sun's
illumination were an act of vision, (as it is likely it is nothing more
ignoble,) how easily would it at once discern all that is upon
one half of the earth at once! All things are naked and open
before the eye of the omniscient Being; he cannot but behold
or know them, and therefore observe them and regard them.

4. His creation, causation, and manutenency, also prove that
he both knoweth and regardeth all things: for can he be either
ignorant, forgetful, or mindless, of that which he made, and still doth so conserve, as to continue a kind of creation of it? His omnipotent will, which gave it a being, doth still continue it; should he withdraw his active sustentation, it would turn all, not only to confusion, but to nothing. And doth he not know and regard what is continually as in his hand, or by continual volition produced or maintained by him? He is the universal cause of all the agency and motion in the world; in him we live, move, and be: and can he be ignorant or regardless of what he doeth? Why will he make, maintain, and move that which he doth not regard?

5. His relation of Owner proveth his regard; all things are his own.

6. And his relation of a Governor proveth his regard, and his actual government of man and all his actions: for he taketh not on him a vain relation; and he that maketh laws for every person and action, doth regard and govern every person and action. But so doth God. *Ergo.*

Sect. 30. Those who think God doth nothing to all the rest of the world, but by those noblest creatures which are next him, and that he hath committed the government of all the rest of the world to the intelligences of the first order, cannot, without blindness and contradiction deny, that he is still himself no less the actual Mover and Governor of all, than if he used no officer or instrument at all.

For, 1. God ceased not himself to be omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, or most benign, when he gave that supposed power to those instruments. 2. He made them, and ordered them, under him, through plenitude of goodness, delighting to communicate power and dignity, as well as being to his creatures, and not through impotency or insufficiency to supply any defect in his own government, and to help him: he useth them to honour them, and not to dishonour himself. He gave away from himself no degree of perfection, nor deprived himself of the smallest part of honour which he communicateth to them; but honoureth himself in the appearance of his perfections by the said communications. As God can do that by himself without the creature which he causeth the creature to do, (as to move, illuminate, and heat the lower parts without the sun as well as with it, or any thing which importeth not impotency or contradiction,) for he ceaseth not to be omnipotent; so that which he doth by any creature, is as truly and fully done by
himself, as if there were no created instrument or cause in it. For that creature which is nothing of itself, and hath not any being but in full dependence on its Maker, can have no action of itself but in full dependence upon him; whatever it doeth, it doth by him: though, as to the specifying comparison, why this rather than that, God hath given men a power with liberty; yet the action, as an action, being from the power which was totally from him, is so itself. There can be no less of God’s agency in any action, because he doeth it by a creature, than if he did it without: though there be more of the creature’s, there is no less of his. His communication of power is not by dis- certation, or division, and diminution of his own. He that knoweth what a Creator and total first cause is, needs no other proof of this. Men, indeed, communicate power to their officers, through their own insufficiency, to be their helpers, and supply the want of their presence or action; but so doth not God. Therefore, if angels or intelligences govern and move all inferior things, they are all governed and moved no less certainly, prox- imately, honourably by God himself, than if he had never used such a subordinate agent; and that immediatione essentiae et virtutis; immediately, though not so immediately as to use no honorary second cause.

Sect. 31. Justice is an attribute of God as Governor, by which he maketh equal laws, and giveth all their due according to them; (or judgeth them righteously according to his laws;) for the ends of government.1

As justice is conceived of in God according to the image in man, which we call the virtue or habit of justice, so it is his eternal nature, being nothing else but the perfection of his in- finite wisdom, and his will or goodness, as respecting a kingdom of subjects as possible and future. For he may so be called just, that hath no kingdom, because he hath that virtue which would do justice, if he had a kingdom: but as justice is taken either for the exercise of righteous government, or for the honourable relation and title of one that doth so exercise it; that is, of an actually just governor, so, formally and demonstra-

1 Dii, qui quos velint, possint laedere, nec a quodam laedi vicissim, non no- cent nisi improbis.—Plut. in Lacon.

Hanc video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam, Legem neque hominum in- genis excogitatae, neque seictum aliquod esse populorum, sed æternum quid- dam quod universum mundum regeret imperandi prohibendiique sapientia. Ita principem legem illam et ultiamum neuentem esse dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Del.—Cicero de Leg. 2. p. 234.
tively, it is an attribute of God, which is not eternal, but subsequent to his relation of a King or Governor. He that is not a governor, is not a just governor. *A negatione est secundi adjecti ad negationem est tertii valet argumentum.*

The law is *norma officii et judicii.* He that maketh a law, thereby telleth his subjects that, according to this they must live, and according to this they must be judged. Indeed, the immediate sense of the words of a law, as such, is not to be taken *de eventu,* but *de debito.* He that saith 'Thou shalt not murder,' saith not, 'Eventually it shall not come to pass that thou shalt not murder,' but 'It shall be thy duty not to do it.' And he that saith, 'If thou murder thou shalt be put to death,' doth primarily, in the sense of the words themselves, mean no more but 'death shall be thy due.' But in that he declareth that he will justly govern according to this law, therefore he meaneth, secondarily and consequently, that ordinarily he will give to all their due. In what cases the letter and nearest sense of a law may be dispensed with, or the lawgiver reserveth a liberty of dispensation to himself, belongeth not to this place to be disputed.